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INTRODUCTION
Customary international law recognizes that every country has the right to
impose both source-based taxation on income earned within its borders by
foreign persons1 and residence-based taxation on the worldwide income of its

1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 411–12
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 27 (2007) [hereinafter AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL
TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW]. For a normative justification of this rule, see Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: “What’s Source Got to Do with It?”—
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own residents.2 Thus, so far as international law is concerned, the legitimacy
of these taxing rights is fully accepted, and neither of these forms of taxation
represents overreaching by governments. Nevertheless, unless ameliorative
steps are taken, their full exercise may produce double taxation of international
income. This is because, in the absence of mitigation, international income
could be subject to source-based taxation in the country where it arises and to
residence-based taxation in the country where the earner is a resident.3 The
resulting tax burden would be a material impediment to international
commerce.
Customary international law solves this conundrum by requiring the
residence country to provide relief.4 The foreign tax credit system is one of the
two commonly used unilateral approaches for discharging this obligation.5
Under the foreign tax credit system, the residence country subtracts the sourcecountry tax on a resident’s foreign income from the residence-country tax on
the resident’s foreign income and collects a so-called residual tax to the extent
that the residence-country tax exceeds the source-country tax. Where a
resident’s source-country tax exceeds the residence-country tax, however, the
residence country does not refund the excess to the resident.6

Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 88–106 (2002) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming
& Peroni, Source Rules]; ROY ROHATGI, BASIC INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 12 (2002).
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at § 412(l)(a); AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 22–27. For a normative justification of this rule, see J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for
Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation]; ROHATGI, supra note 1, at 12. For a discussion on the connection of source-based
taxation and residence-based taxation to the international law concept of sovereignty, see Diane M. Ring,
What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155
(2008).
3 See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 33, 276–77 (3d ed. 2006).
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, at § 413, cmt. a; see also Yariv Brauner, An International
Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 265–66, 284 (2003) [hereinafter Brauner, Crystallization].
5 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 15; Brauner, Crystallization, supra note 4, at 284.
6 See HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
362 (2d ed. 2004); Brauner, Crystallization, supra note 4, at 285; see also ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
& DEV., OECD TAX POLICY STUDIES 17: TAX EFFECTS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: RECENT EVIDENCE
AND POLICY ANALYSIS 99 (2007) [hereinafter OECD, Tax Effects] (“[P]roviding an unlimited tax credit for
foreign income and withholding tax would create incentives for capital importing countries to increase their
host country tax burden, as this would increase host country revenues without affecting the combined
host/home country tax burden on inbound FDI. Thus, foreign tax credit limitations are in order to avoid pure
transfers of tax revenue from home to host countries . . . .”); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S.
CORPORATE TAX 111 (2009) [hereinafter SHAVIRO, DECODING] (“[N]o country is that generous in determining
the allowable use of foreign tax credits.”); Paul R. McDaniel, Territorial vs Worldwide International Tax
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The exemption system is the other internationally accepted unilateral
method for mitigating international double taxation.7 Although the term
“exemption” seems to imply that residence countries employing this approach
will effectively impose a zero rate of tax on all foreign-source income earned
by their residents, in practice, countries that use the exemption system
approach usually confine the zero rate to foreign-source active business
income of resident corporations; other resident taxpayers and other types of
foreign-source income are covered by a worldwide taxation foreign tax credit
system.8
Where the source-country tax is equal to or greater than the residencecountry tax, the foreign tax credit system and the exemption system produce
identical results, because the foreign tax credit completely eliminates the
residence-country tax and treats the resident as if the foreign-source income
were subject to a residence-country tax of zero.9 A difference between the two

Systems: Which Is Better for the U.S.?, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 283, 298 (2007) [hereinafter McDaniel, Territorial vs
Worldwide] (“Neither the U.S. nor any other FTC [foreign tax credit] country will accept or has accepted”
putting its revenues completely at the mercy of foreign countries’ tax rates by allowing an unlimited foreign
tax credit.); JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT’S
INTEREST ALLOCATION RULES 5 (2009) (“[T]he purpose of the foreign tax credit limit is not to ensure the
efficient allocation of resources; rather, it is concerned with protecting the U.S. tax base.”), available at
http://opencrs.com/document/RL34494/2009-01-28. Stated differently, allowing an unlimited foreign tax
credit would amount to a residence-country tax subsidy of high-tax foreign source countries. See Robert J.
Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 975, 978 (1997) [hereinafter Peroni, Back to the Future]; see also SHAVIRO, DECODING, supra,
at 117; Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES
581, 583 (1990) [hereinafter Frisch, International Tax Policy]; Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit and Its
Critics, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 1, 56 (1991) [hereinafter Kingson, Foreign Tax Credit]. Moreover, the
fundamental purpose of the foreign tax credit is to mitigate international double taxation, and this objective is
accomplished if a foreign tax credit is allowed to the extent of the residence-country tax on the resident’s
foreign-source income; any credit in excess of this amount goes beyond the double tax mitigation purpose of
the foreign tax credit. See, e.g., AULT & ARNOLD, supra, at 362; Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to
Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391, 392 (2003).
7 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 15; Brauner, Crystallization, supra note 4, at 284.
The residence country’s allowance of a deduction for source-country tax is a third unilateral approach to
solving the international double taxation problem, but it is only partially effective and rarely used. See
GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 19–20.
8 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 186–87 (2005) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS]; AULT
& ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 357–60; Brauner, Crystallization, supra note 4, at 286–87. The traditional
approach to exemption of foreign income has been to require that foreign income be subject to tax in the
source country in order to qualify for exemption treatment. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 372–75. Since
2007, however, the exemption system in the Netherlands has allowed exemption for dividends from tax haven
companies unless they hold more than 50% non-business assets.
9 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 19–20.
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systems becomes apparent only when the source-country tax is less than the
residence-country tax. In that situation, the foreign tax credit system will
allow the residence country to collect a residual tax equal to the difference,10
but this residual tax will be forgone with respect to a resident corporation’s
active foreign business income if the residence country uses an exemption
system.11
Thus, the significant difference between a foreign tax credit system and an
exemption, or territorial, system is the residence country’s opportunity under
the former, but not the latter, to collect a residual tax on active business income
earned by resident corporations in low-tax foreign countries.12 This difference
would seem to make the exemption approach friendlier to resident corporations
than the foreign tax credit system. Indeed, it is often alleged that the U.S.
foreign tax credit system places U.S. multinational corporations at a
comparative disadvantage when competing for business in low-tax foreign
countries against corporate residents of exemption system countries.13
Consequently, it seems counterintuitive that U.S. multinational
corporations have resisted replacing the U.S. foreign tax credit system with an
exemption regime, which has a zero rate of tax on active foreign business
income, and have preferred to retain the U.S. system with modifications that
weaken some of its rigors.14 The basis for this odd-seeming preference was

10

See id. at 280.
See Joann M. Weiner, Formulary Apportionment: The Way to Tax Profits in the EU, 47 TAX NOTES
INT’L 322, 325 (2007).
12 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
REFORM: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES AND THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. BUSINESSES 2 (2006) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N,
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM]; see generally Weiner, supra note 11.
13 See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, U.S. Tax Policy and Multinational Corporations: Incentives, Problems,
and Directions for Reform, in BORDERLINE CASE: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, CORPORATE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, AND INVESTMENT 109 (James M. Poterba ed., 1997); Robert H. Dilworth, Tax Reform:
International Tax Issues and Some Proposals, INT’L TAX J., Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 5, 28; Chuck O’ Toole, Obama
Presents International Tax Reform Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES 643, 645–46 (2009).
14 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), The NFTC’s Report on Territorial Taxation, 27 TAX NOTES
INT’L, 687, 707 (2002) (article by one of the leading U.S. multinational corporate trade associations taking this
view); JUDY SCARABELLO, NFTC, THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF
AMERICAN COMPANIES: THE NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL COMMENTS TO THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY
PANEL ON TAX REFORM, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/comments/_files/
USInternationalTaxSystem.pdf; see also Robert Goulder & Lee A. Sheppard, ABA Tax Section Tackles
Deferral, 123 TAX NOTES 817, 817 (2009) (quoting statement by John Buckley, Chief Tax Counsel for the
House Ways and Means Committee, that “no group of multinationals in this country has ever supported a
territorial system here”); Lee A. Sheppard, Defending the Obama International Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES
11
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clarified somewhat in the following statement by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation in connection with its proposal for a U.S. exemption
system: “In many cases, the present-law ‘worldwide’ system actually may
yield results that are more favorable to the taxpayer than the results available in
similar circumstances under the ‘territorial’ exemption systems used by many
U.S. trading partners.”15 Similarly, the American Bar Association Section of
Taxation’s Task Force on International Tax Reform recently said that “the
current U.S. international rules allow U.S. multinationals to achieve outcomes
that are superior to exemption.”16
As we have explained in previous articles,17 exemption systems are
inefficient because they distort taxpayer decisions in bizarre ways, and
they also are inequitable because they allow residents who earn foreignsource income to avoid the tax burden borne by their fellow residents
who are primarily domestic-source income earners. Thus, we regard an
exemption system as a poor public policy choice. To the extent that the
current U.S. international income tax regime creates more favorable
results for foreign income-earning U.S. residents than does a
conventional exemption system, the U.S. regime is worse from a public
policy standpoint. Thus, this Article, which details how the current U.S
international income tax system produces untoward results, is entitled
“Worse Than Exemption,” and we often refer to the overly generous
outcomes for foreign income-earning U.S. residents under the U.S.
system as “worse-than-exemption” results.

1391, 1393 (2009) (“American multinationals want all of the benefits of a European-style territorial system
and none of the detriments.”).
15 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 189. For a similar conclusion, see
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR & PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX
AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 104 (2005), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps64969/
TaxReformwholedoc.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM].
16 Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 689 (2006) [hereinafter
International Task Force Report].
17 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Some Perspectives from the United
States on the Worldwide Taxation vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, 3 J. AUSTRALASIAN TAX TCHERS ASS’N 35
(2008), available at http://www.atax.unsw.edu.au/atta/jatta/jattavol3no2/1_JATTA_vol3_no2.pdf; J. Clifton
Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S. Exemption (Territorial) Tax
System, 109 TAX NOTES 1557 (2005) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Exploring the Contours]; Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supra note 2; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E.
Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455
(1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious]; see also Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Obama’s
International Tax Proposal Is Too Timid, 123 TAX NOTES 738 (2009).
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In this Article, we explain how (1) the deferral privilege, (2) defective
income-sourcing and cost-allocation rules, (3) generous and practically
ineffective transfer-pricing rules, (4) largely unrestricted cross-crediting, and
(5) the deduction of foreign losses against U.S.-source income combine to
make the present U.S. international tax scheme worse than a conventional
exemption system—at least with respect to active business income earned in
low-tax foreign countries by U.S. resident corporations. Because of this, the
efforts of U.S. corporations to preserve, but further weaken, the present U.S.
approach in opposition to comprehensive international tax reform are not about
achieving tax parity with corporate residents of exemption system countries.
That goal has already been accomplished and, in certain circumstances,
surpassed by the existing rules. Instead, the efforts of U.S. corporations are
actually a campaign to preserve and strengthen the overly generous tax benefits
enjoyed by U.S. corporations under the incoherent U.S. regime of current law.
That regime gives U.S. corporations a net advantage, at significant cost to the
public fisc, over their exemption country competitors. We begin our analysis
with a consideration of the deferral privilege, one of the fundamental elements
of the current U.S. system.
I. THE DEFERRAL PRIVILEGE—THE BASIC BUILDING BLOCK
The deferral privilege is the anomalous aspect of U.S. international income
tax law that generally allows a U.S. person to conduct profitable overseas
business or investment activities through a low-taxed foreign corporation
without paying U.S. residual tax until the foreign corporation actually
distributes its foreign-source earnings or until the U.S. person sells the foreign
corporation’s stock.18 By utilizing this privilege, U.S. shareholders can defer
substantial amounts of U.S. residual tax and reinvest those amounts in offshore
business operations while incurring only a low foreign tax cost.19 Therefore, the

18 See, e.g., S TAFF OF J OINT C OMM . ON T AXATION , 110 TH C ONG ., E CONOMIC E FFICIENCY AND
S TRUCTURAL ANALYSES OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. P OLICIES FOR F OREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3, 14
(2008) [hereinafter STAFF OF J OINT C OMM. ON T AX ’ N , ALTERNATIVE P OLICIES ]; G USTAFSON , P ERONI
& PUGH, supra note 3, at 21–22, 443–44; Thompson, supra note 17.
19 If the foreign country uses income tax rates approaching, or greater than, U.S. rates, no significant U.S.
residual tax usually remains after taking into account the foreign tax credit. See P AUL R. M C D ANIEL , H UGH
J. A ULT & J AMES R. R EPETTI , I NTRODUCTION TO U NITED S TATES I NTERNATIONAL T AXATION 114
(5th ed. 2005). Deferral, however, also permits dividing high- and low-taxed foreign earnings between
foreign corporations to minimize the tax on repatriation. It also permits delay in the repatriation of indirect
foreign tax credits under Section 902 during periods that credits would not be allowed because of insufficient
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deferral privilege operates as a tax “subsidy” that rewards U.S. persons who
locate corporate operations in low-tax foreign countries.20 This subsidy
frustrates the tax policy goal of locational neutrality by providing a major
incentive for U.S. persons to conduct business operations in and to shift
income to foreign countries that impose little or no tax on the earnings of a
resident corporation.21
In an effort to constrain the most egregious aspects of the deferral privilege,
Congress has enacted a porous set of “anti-deferral” regimes, which, as
explained below, curtail deferral in certain circumstances but leave the
privilege substantially intact.22 On balance, these provisions add tremendous
foreign tax credit limitation—for example, as a result of large domestic losses—and thereby permits avoidance
of the limitations on foreign tax credit carryovers.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 68–83; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating
Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 528–41, 547–51 (2008)
[hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis].
21 This deferral subsidy also violates the closely related tax policy principle of capital export neutrality.
Under capital export neutrality, a U.S. person should pay the same total (U.S. and foreign) tax on all income,
regardless of whether the income is from U.S. or foreign sources. Thus, capital export neutrality is aimed at
reducing the influence of tax considerations on the decision whether to locate investments in the United States or in
a foreign country. See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 17–18; see also David P. Hariton, Notice 9811 Notwithstanding, What Should Be Done with Subpart F?, 79 TAX NOTES 388 (1998). For an argument using a
theory of capital ownership neutrality to attack the capital export neutrality model, see Mihir A. Desai, New Foundations
for Taxing Multinational Corporations, 82 TAXES 39 (Mar. 2004); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Old Rules and
New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937 (2004). For a critique of the capital
ownership neutrality theory, see Fleming & Peroni, Exploring the Contours, supra note 17, at 1572–76. For a more
favorable review of the capital ownership neutrality theory, see SHAVIRO, DECODING, supra note 6, at 125–27.
The deferral subsidy also effectively provides an incentive for less-developed countries to attract
foreign business investment through low tax rates, instead of through an educated and healthy work force or a
legal regime based on the rule of law, reliable enforcement of contract and property rights, and the absence of
corruption. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000). Thus, elimination of the deferral feature from the U.S.
international income tax regime would be a major contribution towards ending this distortion of the behavior
of less developed countries. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Obama’s International Tax Plan a Major Step
Forward, 123 TAX NOTES 735 (2009). In this Article, however, we focus on the impact of deferral on the U.S.
international income tax regime.
22 The deferral privilege has been the subject of extensive analysis and a spirited academic debate. See, e.g.,
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18; U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME
EARNED THROUGH U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY (2000) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T,
DEFERRAL STUDY], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf; SHAVIRO,
DECODING, supra note 6, at 104–06, 114–15,136–38; International Task Force Report, supra note 16; Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Comment on Peroni, Fleming and Shay, “Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign
Source Income”, 52 SMU L. REV. 531 (1999); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know It: Simplification
Potential of Check-the-Box, 74 TAX NOTES 219 (1997); Asim Bhansali, Note, Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of
United States Multinationals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1996); Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis,
supra note 20, at 528–41; J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Deferral: Consider
Ending It, Instead of Expanding It, 86 TAX NOTES 837 (2000) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider
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complexity to the Internal Revenue Code without remedying the inequities and
distortions caused by the deferral privilege.
A. The Existing Scope of the Deferral Privilege
To appreciate the scope and significance of the deferral privilege, it is helpful
to begin by noting that U.S. income tax (net of the credit for foreign income
tax)23 is generally paid on a current, undeferred basis with respect to income
realized from:
(1) U.S. business or investment activities carried on by an individual,
24
25
corporation, limited liability company (LLC), or partnership;
(2) foreign business or investment activities carried on by a foreign
26
branch of a U.S. corporation; and
(3) foreign business or investment activities carried on by a U.S.
individual or by an LLC or partnership to the extent that the LLC’s or
partnership’s foreign-source income is allocable to U.S. members or
27
partners.

Ending It]; Frisch, International Tax Policy, supra note 6; Jane G. Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American
Jobs Act of 1996, 72 TAX NOTES 1165 (1996); Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18 (1993); Joseph Isenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S.
Taxation of the Earnings of Foreign Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062 (1988); Yoshihiro Masui, Comment: A Japanese
View, 52 SMU L. REV. 541 (1999); John McDonald, Comment, Anti-Deferral Deferred: A Proposal for the Reform of
International Tax Law, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 248 (1995); Peter Merrill & Carol Dunahoo, ‘Runaway Plant’
Legislation: Rhetoric and Reality, 72 TAX NOTES 221 (1996); Paul W. Oosterhuis & Roseann M. Cutrone, The Cost
of Deferral’s Repeal: If Done Properly, It Loses Billions, 58 TAX NOTES 765 (1993); Peroni, Back to the Future,
supra note 6, at 986–94; Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It, Don’t Mend
It—Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1609 (2001) [hereinafter Peroni,
End It, Don’t Mend It]; Robert J. Peroni, The Proper Approach for Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled
Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1579 (2001) [hereinafter Peroni, The Proper Approach]; Peroni, Fleming
& Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 17; H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of
Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1525 (2001); Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. AntiDeferral Rules, 74 TAXES 1042 (1996) [hereinafter Shay, Revisiting].
23 I.R.C. § 901(a) (2009).
24 In this context, we are assuming that the limited liability company (LLC) is not classified as a corporation
and is taxed on a passthrough basis for U.S. tax purposes.
25 See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61(a)(2), 61(a)(13), 702, 864(b), 864(c), 871 (b), 875(1), 882. In this context, we are assuming
that the partnership is not classified as a corporation and is taxed on a passthrough basis for U.S. tax purposes.
26 See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(2). For U.S. income tax purposes, a foreign branch is treated as lacking a legal
personality separate from its corporate owner. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, DECODING, supra note 6, at 104. See
generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2008).
27 See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61(a) (2), 61(a) (13), 702. In this context, we are again assuming that the LLC or partnership
is not classified as a corporation and is taxed on a passthrough basis for U.S. tax purposes.
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Foreign-source income earned through a foreign corporation is treated
very differently, however, as a result of two interacting features of U.S.
income tax law. First, the United States does not impose income tax on
foreign corporations except to the extent that their income is effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States or
consists of certain U.S.-source non-business (primarily investment-type)
income.28 Consequently, foreign corporations are not U.S. taxpayers with
respect to their foreign operations, even when their stock is primarily or
entirely owned by U.S. residents.29
Second, the doctrine of Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner30 usually
regards a foreign corporation as a foreign taxpayer that is legally distinct from
its shareholders, whether or not the corporation is controlled by U.S. persons.31
This principle applies to any entity (including an LLC) classified as a foreign
corporation for U.S. tax law purposes, whether under the current “check-thebox” entity classification regulations32 or under the prior “corporate
resemblance” entity classification regulations.33
28 See I.R.C. § 882(b) (limiting gross income of a foreign corporation to U.S.-source non-business income
and income effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business).
29 See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-3(a)(l) (1973). A foreign corporation cannot be an S corporation taxed under
the Subchapter S passthrough regime. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(a)(l), 1361(b)(l).
30 319 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1943) (holding that a corporation is recognized as a separate taxable entity for U.S.
tax purposes if it is formed for a business purpose or conducts any business activity).
31 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.11-1(a) (as amended in 1976), 1.881-1 (as amended in 2005); 1 JOSEPH ISENBERGH,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME ¶ 1:12 (4th ed. 2008); Joseph
Weare & M. L. McMorris, Tax System and Allocation Methods in the United States of America, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN
AND NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 199, 202, 263 (League of Nations 1932). Because of the role of Moline Properties in
establishing the deferral privilege in the United States, we agree with Professor Daniel Shaviro that the origin of deferral
of U.S. income tax on foreign subsidiaries’ foreign-source income was “purely formal or legalistic.” SHAVIRO,
DECODING, supra note 6, at 104. It is certainly a thin reed upon which to base a questionable feature of the U.S.
international tax regime that has far-reaching implications.
32 See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1–301.7701-3 (as originally adopted in T.D. 8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215).
For discussions of these entity classification regulations, see 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 2.02[3] (7th ed. 2006); ROBERT J.
PERONI, STEVEN A. BANK & GLENN E. COVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TAXATION OF BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 40–48, 817–21 (3d ed. 2006).
33 See T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409; T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482; Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). The low
level of activities required to satisfy the Moline Properties standard is illustrated by Bass v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. 595 (1968). In Bass, a Swiss corporation organized to hold undivided working interests in oil-producing
properties satisfied the Moline Properties standard where it (1) purchased and held property (i.e., the interests
in oil-producing land), (2) paid expenses relating to the property, (3) signed contracts relating to the
management of the property, (4) collected distributions from the properties and deposited them in a bank
account, (5) invested excess funds in securities, and (6) filed appropriate tax returns and information reports.
Id. at 600–01; see also Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 520 (1983), nonacq., 1987-2 C.B. 1 (finding
that a Cayman Islands corporation organized to negotiate and perform a foreign hospital management contract
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The preceding rules interact so that U.S. tax on foreign-source business and
investment income earned by a U.S. person through a foreign corporation, even a
U.S.-taxpayer-controlled foreign corporation,34 is generally deferred until (1) the
income is repatriated to the United States through corporate distributions or
(2) the corporation’s stock is sold.35 Deferral may also be curtailed prior to
distribution or sale of the corporation’s stock if one of the Code’s various antideferral regimes applies.
In practice, however, the Code’s anti-deferral regimes often constitute a weak
and idiosyncratic barrier to deferral, particularly in the case of active foreign
business income. The most comprehensive of these regimes is the controlled
foreign corporation (CFC) provisions, also referred to as Subpart F.36 When
these provisions apply, they impose current U.S. tax on four categories of CFC
income, including both active and passive items, which are collectively defined
as Subpart F income.37 The tax is implemented by treating U.S. persons who
own at least ten percent of the voting power of a CFC’s stock,38 actually or by
reason of certain indirect and constructive ownership rules,39 as if each had
received a dividend of their pro rata shares of the CFC’s Subpart F income for
the year.40 In addition, these same persons are treated as receiving dividends
equal to their pro rata shares of the CFC’s earnings and profits that have not
been previously or currently taxed to them as Subpart F income and that are
was not a sham when it carried out business activities such as taking in payments on the contract, entering into
contracts with other entities, making payments to consultants, and observing corporate formalities).
34 In this Article, we often refer to such an entity as a “controlled foreign corporation” or a “CFC.”
35 See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 21–22, 443–44. In addition, Section 956 of the
Code treats a CFC’s investment of its earnings in certain U.S. assets as another triggering event for ending
deferral under the Subpart F provisions.
36 I.R.C. §§ 951–64, 1248 (2009). For detailed discussions of the Subpart F provisions, see 2 BITTKER &
EUSTICE, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 15.60–15.64; 3 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ch. 69 (rev. 3d ed. 2005); 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at chs. 70–75; 1 JOEL D.
KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ch. B3 (2005). For a spirited defense of the
Subpart F provisions as a reasonable compromise regarding the deferral problem, see Keith Engel, Tax
Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the Middle With Subpart F, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1525 (2001). For a critique of this defense, see Peroni, End It, Don’t Mend It, supra note 22.
37 I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(l)(A)(i), 952. As a practical matter, Subpart F income is usually foreign-source
income, see I.R.C. § 952(b), but it is theoretically possible for U.S.-source passive income that has been
subjected to U.S. withholding tax to nevertheless be included in Subpart F income, see I.R.C. §§ 952(b),
954(c)(l)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.952-l(b)(2) (as amended in 2002).
38 I.R.C. § 951(a)(l), (b).
39 I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 958, 318.
40 I.R.C. § 951(a)(l)(A)(i), (a)(2). For convenience, this Article refers to income inclusions under Section
951 as dividends, even though they are not technically dividends under the Code. These inclusions are,
however, subject to earnings and profits limitations, carry indirect foreign tax credits, and are similar in most
respects to dividends.
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invested in certain U.S. assets during the year.41 Section 960 further provides to
the U.S. persons who are charged with receipt of either of these
constructive dividends an indirect credit for foreign income tax liabilities
allocable thereto, if the U.S. persons actually own at least ten percent of the
CFC’s voting stock and if the U.S. persons are either domestic corporations or
individuals who have elected under Section 962 to be taxed as domestic
corporations.42
The CFC regime does not apply to all foreign corporations in which U.S.
persons have an ownership interest. A foreign corporation comes within this
regime only if more than fifty percent of the voting power or value of its shares43
is owned by U.S. persons who each own at least ten percent of the voting
power of the corporation’s stock.44 Moreover, constructive dividends of
Subpart F income and amounts invested in U.S. assets are imputed only to those
U.S. shareholders who own, actually or under certain statutory indirect and
constructive ownership rules, at least ten percent of the CFC’s stock voting
power.45 This means that the CFC provisions are avoidable if U.S. persons keep
their aggregate ownership of a CFC’s stock from exceeding fifty percent of the
voting power or value of the outstanding shares or if each U.S. person’s stock
ownership is kept below the ten percent of voting power threshold.46

41 I.R.C. §§ 951(a)(l)(B), 956, 959; Treas. Reg. § 1.959-l(c) (as amended in 1983); see, e.g., Melvin S.
Adess, Barbara M. Angus & Keith E. Villmow, The Erosion of Deferral: Subpart F After the 1993 Act, 47
TAX LAW. 933, 954 (1994).
42 I.R.C. §§ 960(a)(1), 962(a); see also I.R.C. § 902 (providing an indirect credit in the case of an actual
dividend from a foreign corporation, including a CFC, to a U.S. corporation that actually owns at least ten
percent of its voting power). When the income is reported by a qualifying ten-percent-or-more U.S. shareholder
as an actual dividend, an inclusion under one of the anti-deferral regimes, or a deemed dividend under Section
1248 on the sale of a CFC’s stock, the U.S. shareholder will obtain an indirect foreign tax credit (subject to the
foreign tax credit limitations in Section 904) for a proportionate amount of the creditable foreign taxes paid or
accrued by the foreign corporation (which are “deemed paid” by the U.S. shareholder at the time of the actual
dividend, income inclusion, or deemed dividend income). In addition, the amount of the U.S. shareholder’s
income inclusion or deemed dividend will be “grossed up” (that is, increased) by the amount of the foreign
corporation’s foreign taxes deemed paid by the U.S. shareholder under Section 902 or 960. I.R.C. § 78. The U.S.
shareholder will also receive a direct credit for any creditable foreign tax withheld from an actual dividend, also
subject to the foreign tax credit limitations. I.R.C. §§ 901, 904.
43 I.R.C. § 957(a). The Code lowers the stock ownership threshold for attaining CFC status from fifty
percent to twenty-five percent for certain foreign insurance companies. I.R.C. §§ 953(c), 957(b).
44 I.R.C. §§ 951(b), 957(a). The indirect stock ownership rules in Section 958(a) and the constructive
stock ownership rules in Section 958(b) apply for this purpose.
45 I.R.C. § 951(a)(l).
46 Although a domestic partnership is treated as a U.S. person for purposes of the Subpart F rules, a
foreign partnership is not. I.R.C. §§ 957(c), 7701(a)(30). This has led to the development of foreign
partnership structures for use by U.S. private equity firms making international investments. See Arturo
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Furthermore, the Code’s definition of Subpart F income excludes manufacturing
income.47 Thus, a CFC is effectively outside the Subpart F constructive
dividend provisions to the extent that its income is earned through selling
goods of its own manufacture. By carefully observing the stock ownership
rules described above48 or by ensuring that a CFC has only manufacturing
income and that it abstains from investments in U.S. assets, U.S. shareholders
of a CFC can, and do, readily avoid current U.S. tax on the CFC’s income.49
Current U.S. taxation under the CFC provisions also can be avoided in many
cases involving a CFC’s resale of purchased property or performance of
services.50
Section 1248 is a provision that is closely related to the Code’s CFC
provisions. As a general matter, Section 1248 uses a complex set of rules to
characterize gain recognized on the disposition of CFC stock as dividend
income.51 Nevertheless, it is largely ineffectual as an anti-deferral device
because it does not affect deferral’s time-value-of-money benefit, illustrated
below.52
Requenez II & Timothy S. Shuman, U.S. Private Equity Funds Making Cross-Border Investments—Primary
Tax Considerations, 106 J. TAX’N 349 (2007).
47 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4) (as amended in 2008); Treasury’s Daniel Berman Reflects on Past and
Future International Tax Law, 76 TAX NOTES 1387 (1997); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Notice 98-11:
Tax Treatment of Hybrid Entities, 79 TAX NOTES 877 (1998); David R. Tillinghast, Letter to the Editor, An
Old-Timer’s Comment on Subpart F, 78 TAX NOTES 1739 (1998). Under the current amended regulations, the
scope of activity treated as “manufacturing” by a CFC for the purposes of Subpart F is expanded if a CFC
satisfies a loosely drawn substantial contribution test in relation to contract manufacturing by another person.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4) (as amended in 2008).
48 To be successful, this planning maneuver must navigate carefully both the indirect stock ownership
rules in Section 958(a) and the constructive stock ownership rules in Section 958(b).
49 See 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 74:28; Adess, Angus & Villmow, supra note 41, at 935; Mike
Cooper, Gary Melcher & Clint Stretch, Suddenly Saving Foreign Taxes Is Abusive? An Untenable Proposal,
79 TAX NOTES 885 (1998); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX L. REV. 1301, 1326–28 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Proposal for
Simplification].
50 See I.R.C. §§ 954(d)–(e); Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 17, at 503–05; Stephen
E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 29, 31–33 (Mar. 2004).
51 See 2 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 32, at ¶ 15.63; 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 36, at ¶ 69.14;
GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 549–51; 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ch. 77; 2 KUNTZ &
PERONI, supra note 36, at ¶ B6.03[6].
52 See infra text accompanying notes 69–83. Moreover, Section 1248’s “deemed dividend” treatment of
all or a part of a U.S. shareholder’s gain from the disposition of a CFC’s stock is actually beneficial when the
shareholder is a U.S. corporation that owns at least ten percent of the CFC’s voting stock. It is beneficial
because the deemed dividend treatment will carry an indirect foreign tax credit under Section 902 for a
proportionate amount of the CFC’s foreign taxes “deemed paid” by the U.S. corporate shareholder with respect
to the deemed dividend. In addition, realization of dividend income under Section 1248 on the sale or
liquidation of a CFC’s stock often has the advantage of avoiding foreign withholding tax imposed on actual
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Finally, the most recent addition to the panoply of anti-deferral regimes is
the passive foreign investment company (PFIC) provisions.53 Generally
speaking, this regime attacks the deferral privilege through a complicated
offsetting interest charge mechanism that is applied at the shareholder level.54
The coverage of the PFIC provisions is quite broad in two important respects:
(1) they apply to any U.S. person who owns stock in a foreign corporation
satisfying the definition of a PFIC, no matter how small that shareholder’s
ownership interest in the corporation, and (2) unlike the Subpart F provisions,
the definition of a PFIC does not depend on any degree of concentrated
ownership by U.S. persons of stock in the corporation. The PFIC regime,
however, does not apply to foreign corporations predominantly engaged in
active business operations because it applies only if (1) a corporation’s annual
gross income is at least seventy-five percent passive or (2) at least fifty percent of
the average value (or, in specified circumstances, the adjusted basis) of the
corporation’s assets held during the year produced passive income or were
held for the production of passive income.55 Thus, the PFIC regime does little or
nothing to remedy the problem of deferral of U.S. tax on a U.S. person’s share of
the active business profits earned through a foreign corporation operating in a
low-tax foreign country.
Moreover, the PFIC regime’s role in preventing abuse of the deferral privilege
was further weakened by a 1997 amendment to the Code. That amendment

dividends because gain on a sale of stock or liquidation of a corporation often is exempt from such a
withholding tax. Thus, a corporate shareholder that disposes of CFC stock often prefers dividend treatment
under Section 1248 to sale treatment, particularly in the light of the fact that there is no general capital gain
preference for corporate taxpayers under current law, see GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 549–
50, and that such gains will usually be treated as U.S.-source income for foreign tax credit purposes, see I.R.C.
§ 865(a). But see I.R.C. § 865(f), (h).
53 I.R.C. §§ 1291–1298. The PFIC regime, in its original form, was added to the Code by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1235(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2566–74 (1986). For detailed discussions
of the PFIC provisions, see 2 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 32, at ¶ 15.44; 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note
36, at ¶ 70.1; 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ch. 80; 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 36, at ¶ B2.08.
54 I.R.C. § 1291(a); see also GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 560–62. Elective alternatives
also exist in the form of a passthrough regime for a qualified electing fund (QEF), see I.R.C. § 1293, and a
mark-to-market regime, see I.R.C. § 1296. To make the QEF election, the fund must supply certain
information. Often, non-U.S. managed funds are reluctant to provide the fund-level information necessary to
make a QEF election. Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 17, at 463 n.48. Nevertheless,
these funds will do so if they are being marketed to U.S. individual investors who are eligible for a preferential
tax rate on capital gains and want the capital gain passthrough treatment accorded the QEF’s long-term capital
gains. Id. Obtaining entity-level information is a potential problem whenever an anti-deferral regime requires
current inclusion by a U.S. shareholder of the income of a non-U.S.-controlled foreign corporation and is
exacerbated when the shareholder owns only a small interest in the corporation. Id.
55 I.R.C. § 1297(a).
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provided that a foreign corporation otherwise qualifying as both a CFC and a
PFIC would not be treated as a PFIC with respect to any Section 951(b) “United
States shareholder,” thus eliminating the overlap between the CFC and PFIC
regimes.56 This was a critical development because after the 1996 repeal of the
excess passive asset rules of former Section 956A, the PFIC fifty percent passive
asset test was the only aggregate limitation on a CFC’s ability to engage in two
U.S. tax-deferred offshore accumulation strategies. The first strategy applies
where none of the CFC’s U.S. resident shareholders are covered by Subpart F
because they all fall below the ten percent ownership requirement. In this case,
the CFC can accumulate its earnings for the economic benefit of its
shareholders simply by investing and reinvesting its earnings in passive foreign
assets. Where the CFC has shareholders to whom Subpart F does apply, the
second strategy becomes relevant. It involves the CFC investing its earnings in
foreign property, such as land and non-dividend-paying stock, that does not
produce current Subpart F income. Thus, the 1997 elimination of the
CFC/PFIC overlap allowed CFCs to employ these accumulation strategies to
defer indefinitely U.S. tax on unlimited amounts of low-taxed foreign-source
earnings.57 This legislative change significantly reduced the effectiveness of the
PFIC regime as an anti-deferral device and represented a major step backward
in anti-deferral reform.
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the Internal Revenue Code’s
anti-deferral provisions do not reach substantial amounts of low-taxed foreignsource earnings, for example, when the foreign corporation has substantial
active business income or its U.S. ownership is below applicable thresholds.
In short, the anti-deferral regimes are more like a set of sieves than barriers to
deferral.58
B. The Incongruity of Elective Deferral
The generous availability of deferral has been characterized as representing
a balance between (1) a concern for the ability of U.S. businesses to compete in

56 I.R.C. § 1297(e) (added by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1175, 111 Stat.
788, 990–93 (1997)).
57 See Charles I. Kingson, The Great American Jobs Act Caper, 58 TAX L. REV. 327, 382–84 (2005).
58 See Michael C. Durst, The President’s International Tax Proposals in Historical and Economic
Perspective, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L 747, 751 (2009) [hereinafter Durst, President’s Proposals] (characterizing
the U.S. anti-deferral rules as “porous”). See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1021–22 (1987); GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH,
supra note 3, at 446–49; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 17, at 478–92.
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foreign markets and (2) protection of the U.S. tax base and, perhaps, the goal of
promoting worldwide economic well-being through the principle of capital
export neutrality. To be specific, the general availability of deferral for CFC
income reduces the effective rate of U.S. tax on foreign-source income. This
outcome is said to make U.S. controlled businesses more competitive in low-tax
foreign jurisdictions vis-à-vis both indigenous businesses and foreign-controlled
corporations whose home countries either impose no home country tax on
income earned outside their borders or permit deferral of home country tax
until the income is repatriated from the low-tax jurisdiction.59 However, in
the limited circumstances where Subpart F or the PFIC regime strips away
the deferral privilege, unprivileged foreign-source income is subject to
current U.S. tax as if it had been earned in the United States. Therefore, U.S.
taxation becomes a neutral factor in the decision of a U.S. taxpayer to locate the
unprivileged income-generating operations in either the United States or
abroad—a result that effectuates the principle of capital export neutrality as
well as protecting residence-based taxation. Thus, as noted above, the present
U.S. regime of elective deferral, tempered by anti-deferral limitations, is often
characterized as balancing international competitiveness objectives against a
concern for capital export neutrality.60
Arguably, however, the Internal Revenue Code’s overall structure
strikes a larger and different balance regarding the taxation of foreign-source
income earned by U.S. persons, and the general rule of CFC income deferral
represents a dramatic departure from this larger balance. To be specific, since
1913, the Code has provided that all domestic taxpayers—U.S. citizens, resident
aliens, and domestic corporations—are currently taxable on their worldwide
income, including their foreign-source earnings. The 1913 language
expressed this point by imposing the tax on “gains or profits and income derived

59 See NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 12, 127
(2001) [hereinafter NFTC, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY]. There is, however, no strong empirical evidence
that U.S. multinational businesses generally require this tax system assistance to be competitive in foreign
markets. See infra Section I.E.
60 See NFTC, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 59, at 56, 59, 93, 126.
This balance
characterization appears in the legislative history of Subpart F, see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 57–58
(1962), and has been repeated, expressly or by implication, in various Treasury documents, see, e.g., U.S.
TREAS. DEP’T, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 22, at 22; U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM:
AN INTERIM REPORT 7–8 (1993) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP.]; 1 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TAX
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 142 (1984) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T,
TAX REFORM], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/tax-reform/tres84v1All.pdf.
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from any source whatever.”61 The present statutory language is “all income from
whatever source derived.”62
Of course the countries in which foreign-source income is earned assert a
right to impose their own levies. This means that the U.S. tax on foreign-source
income of U.S. persons is effectively a second layer of taxation that would, in the
absence of mitigation, cause foreign-source income to be much more heavily
burdened than domestic-source income. The United States responded to this
problem in 1918 by adopting a foreign tax credit, which allows a U.S. person to
take a credit against her U.S. income tax liability for qualifying foreign taxes.
But if this credit had been allowed without limitation in the full amount of a
U.S. resident’s foreign tax liability, the U.S. person who earned income in a
country with income tax rates greater than U.S. rates could have used the
excess of her foreign tax payments over the U.S. tax on her foreign-source income
to offset U.S. tax on her domestic-source income. If this were permitted,
foreign countries could adopt very high rates of tax and feel secure in the
knowledge that the excess tax on U.S. persons would actually be funded out of
the U.S. Treasury in the form of forgone U.S. tax on U.S.-source income. To
prevent this result, the credit was limited to the U.S. tax on a domestic taxpayer’s
foreign-source income63 and this limitation, with many additional layers of
complexity, persists today.64
This U.S. tax structure—consisting of a current levy on domestic taxpayers’
income “from whatever source derived” but mitigated by a foreign tax credit
limited to the U.S. tax on foreign-source income—balances multiple competing
factors. First, it balances the claim of the United States to a current tax on
foreign-source income of its residents against the legitimate taxing claims of
source countries with respect to that income; but, in turn, this structure also
balances the source-country taxing claims against the legitimate U.S. interest in

61

Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II.B., 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913) (emphasis added).
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2009).
63 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BACKGROUND PAPER: TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 45 (2007) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, BACKGROUND PAPER], available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%20r.pdf; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N,
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 12, at 13.
64 See I.R.C. § 904. To be completely consistent with the principle of capital export neutrality, the
United States would have to repeal its foreign tax credit limit and make the foreign tax credit completely
refundable. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 12, at 65.
However, the United States has determined that weightier considerations trump capital export neutrality and
require the imposition of the present foreign tax credit limitation. See supra note 6, text accompanying notes
63–64.
62
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preventing foreign governments from raiding the U.S. Treasury to finance their
operations and programs. The general framework that emerges from this
balance is that foreign-source income of U.S. persons is subject to current U.S.
tax except to the extent that a creditable foreign tax offsets the U.S. tax. When
the U.S. tax structure is understood in these terms, the elective deferral of U.S.
residual tax on the foreign-source income of a CFC stands out as an incongruity.
Of course, deferral proponents will return to the earlier discussion of how
deferral derives from the combination of (1) U.S. non-taxation of a foreign
corporation’s foreign-source income and (2) the separate legal personalities of
a foreign corporation and its U.S. shareholders.65 They will argue that these
features of the U.S. income tax regime establish that deferral is the norm.66
As previously explained, however, the Code’s larger pattern requires U.S.
business owners and investors to pay current U.S. tax on their realized income
“from whatever source derived,” except when U.S. residents earn foreignsource income through a foreign C corporation. Thus, this exception is a clear
departure from the general tax treatment of U.S. business owners and
investors. Stated differently, current U.S. taxation of business income is the
norm and deferral is an anomaly.67
C. The Effect of the Deferral Privilege
The anomalous deferral of U.S. tax on foreign-source income of a U.S.controlled foreign corporation provides a well-known incentive for U.S.
persons to carry on business in low-tax countries through a CFC and then to
65

See supra text accompanying notes 28–33.
See NFTC, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 59, at 3 n.3; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 10 (2008) (characterizing
present U.S. law as “ambiguous” with respect to what the general rule is for taxing foreign-source income
earned by U.S. persons through a foreign corporation).
67 See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 159 (1985); Fleming & Peroni,
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis, supra note 20, at 532–34. Thus, we respectfully disagree with the
conclusion of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation that “present law is ambiguous as to what
constitutes the general rule for taxing foreign earnings.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG.,
A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 41 (2008). This conclusion has led the Joint
Committee Staff to recharacterize deferral as a “Tax-Induced Structural Distortion” instead of a tax
expenditure. Id. Nevertheless, the views of the Joint Committee Staff are generally consistent with the views
expressed in this Article regarding the untoward effects of deferral. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N,
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 14–20. Moreover, deferral continues to be treated as a tax
expenditure in the tax expenditure lists prepared by the Treasury Department. See, e.g., BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 288 (2008) [hereinafter 2009
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES].
66
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reinvest the profits in the CFC’s business instead of repatriating them to the
United States.68 This is contrary to the goal of locational neutrality and
violates the policy of capital export neutrality. For purposes of this Article,
68

U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 7. In overall terms, the deferral subsidy may be
quite large. Thus, the tax expenditures discussion in the Bush administration’s fiscal year 2009 budget
document estimated that the revenue effect of deferral would be $13.78 billion for fiscal year 2009 and a total
of $76.28 billion for the fiscal years 2009–2013. See 2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 67, at 298.
The budget document also estimated that deferral would be the 17th largest tax expenditure (out of 161) for
fiscal year 2009 and the 19th largest aggregate tax expenditure over the fiscal years 2009–2013. See id.
Deferral can also be large factor at the firm level. A recent Wall Street Journal study concluded that
General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Exxon Mobil, Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard, Merck, Eli Lilly, Procter &
Gamble, Johnson & Johnson, and Google deferred tax recognition of a total of $57.5 billion of foreign-source
profits for 2008 alone. See Jesse Drucker, Titans Vow Overseas-Tax Fight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2009, at C1.
The article noted that “Johnson & Johnson’s effective tax rate was 12.4 percentage points lower because of its
$4 billion it said was earned and reinvested overseas, primarily in Puerto Rico and Ireland.” Id. at C5.
Another recent article in Business Week discusses how corporations taking advantage of deferral of U.S. tax
on overseas profits are often among the least-taxed industries in the United States. See Nanette Byrnes, The
Unequal Tax Burden on Companies, BUSINESS WEEK, May 4, 2009, at 49.
There has been a lively debate over whether increased foreign investment by U.S. multinationals
causes net job loss or net job creation in the United States. Compare Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James
R. Hines, Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of U.S. Multinationals, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y
181 (2009), with Martin A. Sullivan, Will Obama’s International Proposals Kill U.S. Jobs?, 123 TAX NOTES
1063 (2009). Regardless of how this controversy is ultimately settled, it is clear that deferral imposes a
revenue cost on the U.S Treasury for the reasons shown infra in Example 1 and Tables 1 and 2. Moreover,
even if this cost produces a net job gain in the United States, it is still necessary to ask whether the gain is
sufficient to justify the cost and whether the lost revenue should have been devoted to other important matters
such as financing a reduction in the general corporate income tax rate, increased spending for antiterrorism
measures, or healthcare. See generally Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis, supra
note 20, at 525–28.
Some commentators have disputed all of this, however. They have argued that if deferral were
eliminated, CFC losses would become deductible by U.S. shareholders. They also have argued that the excess
foreign tax credits of many U.S. corporations would become usable against current U.S. tax on CFC income.
They assert that as a result of these two developments, little revenue would be gained from ending deferral.
See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 10; Frisch, International Tax Policy, supra note 22, at
585–86; LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, The Future of Deferral, in TAXING AMERICA 239 (Karen B. Brown & Mary
Louise Fellows eds., 1996); Oosterhuis & Currone, supra note 22, at 767–68; Shay, Revisiting, supra note 22,
at 1061; see also Kathleen Matthews, How Should Clinton Handle International Tax Issues?, 57 TAX NOTES
985, 986 (1992); Roundtable Discussion—International Taxation: D. Kevin Dolan, Stephen E. Shay, and
David R. Tillinghast, ABA SEC. OF TAX’N NEWSL., Fall 1993, at 8. Under this view, the preceding revenue
loss estimate may be substantially overstated. Nevertheless, any restriction on the ability to electively defer
income or take losses into account currently would surely raise revenue in the long run because taxpayers
always make elections to the detriment of the fisc. In any event, regardless of how this empirical question is
resolved, the deferral privilege clearly encourages U.S. taxpayers to carry on business operations through
CFCs in low-tax foreign countries if the foreign operations will be profitable. Thus, those who are primarily
concerned with capital export neutrality and/or locational neutrality will favor ending deferral regardless of
whether the revenue consequences to the U.S. Treasury are a large gain, a small gain, or a loss. See Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, The Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, 79 TAX NOTES 1775 (1998); Shay,
Revisiting, supra note 22, at 1061, 1063; STATEMENT OF STANFORD G. ROSS, 93D CONG., GENERAL TAX
REFORM, PT. ll 1720, 1724–25 (Comm. Print 1973).

FLEMING PERONI&SHAY GALLEYSFINAL

98

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

however, the salient points are that the combination of deferral and
reinvestment of CFC profits effectively shrinks the U.S. residual tax on income
earned by a CFC in a low-tax foreign country. The following example
illustrates this consequence of the deferral privilege:
EXAMPLE 1
DC, a U.S. resident multinational corporation on the cusp of building
a new manufacturing plant, is considering whether to locate this
facility in the United States or in Country A, a tax haven that lacks a
business profits tax, a withholding tax regime, and a branch profits
69
tax. DC pays U.S. federal income tax at a thirty-five-percent rate.
Regardless of where DC’s new plant is situated, it will produce a $2
million before-tax profit in Year 1 that will be reinvested at a ten
percent rate of return in the new manufacturing operation and then
extracted and paid to DC’s headquarters at the end of Year 2. The
interest and discount rates are ten percent per annum. The columns
of Table 1 illustrate the outcomes of two different scenarios. In
Column (1), the new factory is located in the United States and
governed by current law. In Column (2), the new factory is a
Country A asset of DC’s 100-percent-controlled Country A
subsidiary, and the United States employs a worldwide income tax
system that has the deferral privilege but also has effective crosscrediting barriers so that the U.S. residual tax on repatriated foreignsource income is not offset by excess foreign tax credits on high70
taxed foreign income.

69 This example expressly assumes that Country A is a tax haven. Accordingly, if these omitted taxes
were imposed, they would have a very low rate and would be fully eliminated through foreign tax credits
against DC’s U.S. income tax liability. Thus, all three taxes would likely be inconsequential and, to simplify
this and succeeding examples, we assume that they are not imposed by Country A.
70 As discussed in more detail in infra Section IV of this Article, cross-crediting involves applying excess
foreign tax credits from high-taxed foreign income against the U.S. residual tax on low-taxed foreign income,
such as the business profits earned in Country A.
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Table 1
Column (1)
U.S. Location,
Current Law71

Column (2)
Country A CFC,
Worldwide Taxation with
Deferral, But No CrossCrediting
$2,000,000

Year 1 Net Profit

$2,000,000

Year 1 U.S. Tax @ 35%

-

Invested in Year 2 @ 10%

$1,300,000

$2,000,000

Year 2 Return

+ 130,000

+ 200,000

Year 2 35% U.S. Tax on Year
2 Return

-

45,500

-0-

Distribution to DC
Headquarters

$1,384,500

$2,200,000

Dividend Tax @ 35%

-0-73

700,000

-0-72

-

770,000

$1,384,500
$1,430,000
$770,000 (700,000 x 1.1)
+ 45,500
$815,500
$770,000
Difference Between Total Tax in Column (1) and Total Tax in Column (2) Valued at
End of Year 2—i.e., Total Tax Lost in Column (2): $815,500 - $770,000 = $45,500
After-Tax Net To DC
Total Tax Payments Valued at
End of Year 2

Table 1 illustrates the simultaneous occurrence of two related phenomena.
First, the $770,000 dividend tax in Column (2) of Table 1 is simply the Year 2
71

Column (1) also shows the results if the factory were owned in Country A by DC’s Country A
subsidiary, but U.S. tax law was reformed to (i) end international tax deferral completely and (ii) effectively
prevent cross-crediting.
72 There is no U.S. dividend tax in this column because the distribution to U.S. headquarters is either an
intracorporate payment from a U.S. branch or a distribution by a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary that is nontaxable under either the consolidated return rules or Section 243(a)(3). Alternatively, if DC located the factory
in Country A and used a Country A subsidiary to make the investment, but deferral were ended completely and
cross-crediting were prevented, the distribution by the Country A subsidiary to DC would be exempt from U.S.
tax because the earnings of the Country A subsidiary out of which the distribution was made would have
already been subject to U.S. tax in the hands of its U.S. shareholder, DC, in years 1 and 2. Cf. I.R.C. § 959
(2009).
73 Because the Country A income is manufacturing income, Subpart F does not subject it to a Year 1 U.S.
tax. See I.R.C. § 954(d). Thus, the $700,000 Year 1 tax in Column (1) is deferred in Column (2) and this
causes the Year 2 investment to be scaled up from $1,300,000 in Column (1) to $2,000,000 in Column (2).
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value of the $700,000 U.S. tax that was collected at the end of Year 1 in
Column (1) but deferred until the end of Year 2 in Column (2).74 In other
words, in Column (2) the thirty-five percent Year 1 tax grew at a market rate of
interest (assumed to be ten percent in this example) during the one-year
deferral period, and because it did so, its Year 1 present value remained at
$700,000 and the government was indifferent to the deferral. But if the rate of
growth of the deferred tax is less than the market rate of interest, then the value
of the Column (1) $700,000 tax will shrink over the deferral period and
approach zero if the deferral period is sufficiently long (i.e., deferral is
tantamount to exemption in this scenario).
The rate of growth of DC’s deferred tax will, indeed, be less than the ten
percent market rate because of a second phenomenon illustrated in Table 1.
Note that the difference in tax payment amounts between Columns (1) and (2)
is $45,500,75 which equals DC’s tax incurred in Column (1) on the Year 2
investment return when the factory is built in the United States. In other
words, the consequence of deferral in Column (2) is to allow DC to avoid the
$45,500 Year 2 U.S. tax that DC would have paid if it had forgone the deferral
benefit of Column (2) and built the factory in the United States. Stated
differently, in Table 1, DC and the U.S. Treasury experienced two different tax
consequences that moved on parallel tracks. In Column (2), the Year 1
corporate profits tax of $700,000 grew at a market rate of interest from
$700,000 to $770,000 and was transformed into a deferred dividend tax equal
to that latter amount. This allowed the deferred tax collected at the end of
Year 2 in Column (2) to maintain a Year 1 value of $700,000 so that the U.S.
Treasury lost nothing and DC gained nothing from the deferral of the Year 1
$700,000 tax to the close of Year 2. On the other parallel track, however, the
Column (2) deferral of the Column (1) $700,000 Year 1 tax caused the U.S.
Treasury to lose a Year 2 tax of $45,500. Thus, even though the deferred
$700,000 Year 1 tax seemingly “grew” in Column (2) to $770,000 at the end
of Year 2, the U.S. Treasury, nevertheless, suffered a simultaneous loss from
deferral in the amount of $45,500,76 and DC experienced an equal
74 $700,000 + ($700,000 × .10) = $770,000. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N,
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 14; 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶¶ 68.1.2, 70.4.
75 $815,500 - $770,000 = $45,500.
76 It is tempting to argue that the $770,000 tax that the U.S. Treasury collects in Column (2) at the end of
Year 2 must surely include the $45,500 Year 2 tax shown in Column (1). To see why this is incorrect,
however, note that a comparison of the total tax collected in Column (1) with the Column (2) tax collection
requires bringing the $700,000 Year 1 tax in Column (1) forward to the end of Year 2, where we have already
seen that it will have a value of $770,000 under the 10% interest rate assumption. When this value is

FLEMING PERONI&SHAY GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

WORSE THAN EXEMPTION

11/9/2009 8:35:26 AM

101

simultaneous gain compared to the no-deferral scenario illustrated in Column
(1).
This loss effectively reduces DC’s Year 2 tax burden and the U.S.
Treasury’s Year 2 tax collection from $770,000 to $724,500.77 Stated

combined with the $45,500 Year 2 tax in Column (1), the total Column (1) tax collection equals $815,500 at
the end of Year 2. This is $45,500 more than Treasury’s $770,000 Year 2 tax collection in Column (2). Thus,
the $770,000 Column (2) tax collection does not include the $45,500 Year 2 tax shown in Column (1). (As
explained above, the $770,000 Year 2 tax in Column (2) is merely the $700,000 Year 1 deferred tax plus 10%
interest thereon to reflect the twelve-month collection delay.) Clearly, the Column (2) tax result that DC
achieves through deferral causes the U.S. Treasury to suffer a real loss of $45,500, compared to the nondeferral result in Column (1).
Example 1 bears a superficial resemblance to a topic that is important in the field of consumption
taxation—the equivalent end results of (1) expensing (deducting) the cost of an income producing asset but
taxing the total yield of the asset and (2) not deducting the cost of the asset but exempting its yield from
taxation. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX:
DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 72 (3d ed. 2004). This equivalence is dependent on several assumptions
including unchanging tax rates during the period in question. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital
Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549, 551–52 (1985). However, the basic point of Example
1—that deferral effectively avoids income tax on the yield produced by investing the deferred income—is not
dependent on these assumptions because it is not based on the expensing/exemption equivalency. Instead it is
based on a comparison of current and deferred income taxation.
One commentator, however, argues that the U.S. Treasury’s loss from deferral is limited to the interest
charge on the additional government borrowing that results from the Treasury’s deferred receipt of tax. See
Dilworth, supra note 13, at 29, 34, 39. For the reasons discussed above, we disagree.
77 $770,000 - $45,500 = $724,500. See generally 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 68.1.2.
It is fair to ask why the U.S. Treasury’s net tax collection is not simply $815,500 (the Column (1) tax
payments valued at the end of Year 2) - $45,500 (the Year 2 tax lost on account of deferral) = $770,000. Are
we double counting when we also subtract $45,500 from $770,000 and conclude that the net tax collection is
$724,500? We conclude that our approach is correct because two distinct phenomena are occurring in Column
(2). First, the $700,000 Year 1 deferred tax is apparently growing at a rate of 10% per annum to $770,000
($700,000 + [$700,000 x .10] = $770,000). But a comparison of Columns (1) and (2) shows a second and
different phenomenon occurring at the same time—a loss of a $45,500 Year 2 tax in the Column (2) deferral
scenario. Although these two events occur over the same time period, they are distinct. There is a growth
event and a loss event and each must be accounted for. Because both involve the same taxpayer (DC) and both
become noticeable at the same time (the end of Year 2), a reasonable and informative way to account for both
events is to offset them. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note
18, at 14. We have done so by subtracting the U.S. Treasury’s $45,500 Year 2 loss from its nominal $770,000
tax collection at the end of Year 2. This shows that the Year 2 tax collection in the deferral scenario is only
$724,500 instead of $770,000.
A second way to describe the U.S. Treasury’s situation in Column (2) is to note that the U.S. Treasury
effectively had a $700,000 investment in the Country A subsidiary during Year 2. See Peroni, Fleming &
Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 17, at 465–66; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE
POLICIES, supra note 18, at 14–15. Under the 10% interest rate assumption, the yield on this investment at the
end of Year 2 should have been $70,000. Instead, the U.S. Treasury’s $45,500 loss reduced the yield to
$24,500 ($70,000 - $45,500), which means that the loss reduced the U.S. Treasury’s rate of return from 10% to
3.5% ($24,500 ÷ $700,000 = 3.5%). Thus, deferral resulted in the U.S. Treasury receiving a below-market
return. The 6.5 percentage point difference between the 10% market rate of return and the 3.5% actual return
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differently, because of the U.S. Treasury’s $45,500 loss in Column (2), the net
tax collected in Column (2) shrank to only 94.1 percent of its $770,000
nominal amount,78 which is the amount required for the deferred tax to
maintain a Year 1 present value of $700,000. By extending this analysis to
Year 5 in Table 2, we can see that this shrinkage increases if the earnings on
the investment of the $700,000 tax that was deferred in Column (2) are
themselves reinvested, along with the deferred tax, in the CFC’s business
instead of being withdrawn at the end of Year 2.

was captured by DC (.065 × $700,000 = $45,500 of tax avoided by DC). See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 14.
Of course, consumption tax advocates regard the $45,500 avoided tax as an illegitimate double tax that
should not be imposed in the first place. The federal income tax is, however, predominantly an income tax
based on the ability-to-pay principle, instead of a consumption tax, and when income tax analysis is applied,
DC has avoided $45,500 in Column 2. See Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis,
supra note 20, at 511–17, 532.
78 ($770,000 - $45,500) ÷ $770,000 = 94.1%. The approach taken in Example 1 differs from the more
traditional way of illustrating the effect of deferral, which is to characterize the deferred tax as an interest-free
loan from the government and to describe the taxpayer’s benefit, as well as the U.S. Treasury’s loss, as
forgone interest. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 22, at 16 (quoting U.S. Treasury
Secretary Dillon). Under this more conventional approach, the $700,000 Year 1 deferred tax in Column (2) is
treated as loan principal with respect to which there is $70,000 of Year 2 forgone interest resulting from the
10% interest rate assumption. If DC had paid this interest, however, it would have deducted the $70,000
payment under Section 163 and generated a $24,500 tax saving ($70,000 deduction × 35% marginal tax rate).
Thus, the benefit to DC from the interest-free loan during Year 2 is DC’s after-tax avoided interest cost, which
is $70,000 - $24,500 tax saving = $45,500. This exactly equals the $45,500 of tax that DC avoided in Column
(2) of Example 1. Thus, the interest-free loan approach and the avoided tax approach reach the same result.
We have chosen to use the avoided tax approach in Example 1, and in infra Table 2, because, as we have
explained elsewhere, the analogy of deferral to an interest-free loan is significantly flawed and the better
analogy regards the U.S. Treasury as a forced equity investor in the business of DC’s Country A CFC. See
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 22, at 843–44; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting
Serious, supra note 17, at 465–66; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra
note 18, at 14–15.
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Table 2–Example 1 Extended Through Year 5
Column 1
U.S. Location,
Current Law

Column 2
Country A CFC, Worldwide
Taxation with Deferral, But
No Cross-Crediting
$2,200,000

Invested in Year 3 @ 10%

$1,384,500

Year 3 Return

+ 138,450

Year 3 35% Tax on Year 3
Return

-

48,458

-0-

Invested in Year 4 @ 10%

$1,474,492

$2,420,000

Year 4 Return

+ 147,449

+ 242,000

Year 4 35% Tax on Year 4
Return

-

51,607

-0-

Invested in Year 5 @ 10%

$1,570,334

$2,662,000

Year 5 Return

+ 157,033

+ 266,200

Year 5 35% Tax on Year 5
Return

-

Distribution to DC
Headquarters
Dividend Tax @ 35%
After-Tax Net to DC

54,962

+220,000

-0-

$1,672,405

$2,928,200

-0-

- 1,024,870

$1,672,405

$1,903,330

Total Tax Payments Valued at
$1,255,794
$1,024,870
End of Year 5
Difference Between Total Tax in Column (1) and Total Tax in Column (2) Valued at End
of Year 5—i.e., Total Tax Lost in Column (2): $1,255,794 - $1,024,870 = $230,924

At the end of Year 5, the difference between the tax totals in Columns (1)
and (2) is now $230,924,79 as opposed to the $45,500 difference in Table 1 at
79 $1,255,794 - $1,024,870 = $230,924. This is the sum of the annual taxes on the Column (1)
investment returns for Years 2–5, with each year’s tax being valued at the end of Year 5 under the 10% interest
assumption. Thus, the annual taxes for Years 2–5 in Column (1) were effectively avoided in Column (2). See
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 14–15.
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the end of Year 2. This means that the U.S. Treasury suffers a $230,924
cumulative loss over the deferral period and the Year 5 tax in Column 2
effectively shrinks to $793,946.80 This is only 77.5 percent81 of the $1,024,870
nominal amount, which is the amount necessary for the deferred tax to stay
“even” with a 10 percent market rate of return. By contrast, the Year 2 tax in
Column (2) of Table 1 was effectively 94.1 percent of the $770,000 nominal
amount. Thus, as deferral is prolonged through reinvestment in DC’s Country
A subsidiary, the U.S. residual tax on each year’s reinvested profit will
continue to shrink.82 Eventually, the residual tax will be negligible and DC
will have effectively achieved, on an elective basis, the result of an exemption
system83 because there is no residual tax in an exemption regime.

80

$1,024,870 - $230,924 = $793,946.
$793,946 ÷ $1,024,870 = 77.5%.
82 The reason for this increasing shrinkage is that in Table 2 only $724,500 of deferred tax was
effectively carried from Year 2 into Year 3, instead of the $770,000 amount that was necessary for the U.S.
Treasury to enjoy a 10% market rate of return during Year 2 on the $700,000 of Year 1 deferred tax. See
supra text accompanying note 76. Thus, the U.S. Treasury began Year 3 at $724,500, instead of $770,000. To
keep from falling farther behind, the U.S. Treasury needed to have a return of $72,450 ($724,500 × .10) during
Year 3 on the deferred tax so that its Year 3 tax collection would be $796,950 ($724,500 + $72,450).
However, after taking the $48,458 Year 3 avoided tax loss into account, the U.S. Treasury earned only $23,992
($72,450 - $48,458) on the $724,500 “principal” amount, which is a return of only 3.3% ($23,992 ÷ $724,500)
at a time when the market rate is assumed to be 10%. Accordingly, the U.S. Treasury’s net Year 3 tax
collection is only $748,492 ($724,500 deferred from Year 2 + $23,992 Year 3 net tax collection = $748,492),
instead of $796,950. Thus, the combination of the U.S. Treasury’s inadequate starting point plus its belowmarket rate of return accounts for the increasing shrinkage at the end of Year 3. A similar scenario plays out
for Years 4 and 5.
83 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 16 n.41; OECD, Tax
Effects, supra note 6, at 63–64 (empirical data indicate that deferral and other features of worldwide systems
tend to minimize the difference between foreign tax credit systems and territorial systems); Allison D.
Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 639,
682 (2005) (stating that by allowing deferral, the United States and other residence-based taxing jurisdictions
“mirror” territorial tax systems “by effectively providing tax exemptions for foreign income”); see also
Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 844 (2000)
(“[A] worldwide system that defers the tax on foreign source income until repatriation has the same effect on
allocation of capital between U.S. MNEs [multinational enterprises] and foreign MNEs as an exemption
system.”). The preceding analysis also shows that with respect to a CFC’s retained earnings, deferral allows
the CFC to function for its U.S. shareholders as if it were a Section 103 tax-exempt bond fund. Unlike the
Section 103 exemption, however, the effective exemption for the investment return on the CFC’s retained
earnings does not inure to the benefit of a U.S. state or local government. Instead, the exemption is captured
by the CFC’s U.S. shareholders. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note
18, at 14–15.
81
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D. Transfer Pricing Rules and the Anti-Deferral Regimes
An important function of Subpart F and related regimes is to serve as a
backstop to the Section 482 rules on intercompany pricing with respect to
outbound transactions.84 Some deferral proponents contend that “transfer
pricing law and administration have undergone profound changes that
seriously call into question the continued relevance of Subpart F to transfer
pricing enforcement.”85 We disagree with this overly optimistic assessment of
the effectiveness of the current transfer pricing rules.
The arm’s-length standard, as interpreted in the current regulations under
Section 482, allows a taxpayer to fully comply with the transfer pricing rules by
selecting the most advantageous price that falls within a range of allowable
alternatives.86 This approach leaves a generous area within which U.S.
corporations enhance the effect of deferral by shifting income at the margin to
foreign subsidiaries in low-tax foreign jurisdictions without violating the rules in
the Section 482 regulations.87 In addition, enforcement of the U.S. transfer
pricing rules is problematic.88 We explore the implications of these points in infra
Section III.

84

See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 458 n.12.
NFTC, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 59, at 65; see also 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 68.1.2.
86 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e) (as amended in 2006).
87 As stated in a report by the ABA Section of Taxation’s Task Force on International Tax Reform:
“Even with small price adjustments, the aggregate amount of income that may be shifted within the range
allowable under the regulations (and amount of tax saved) can be material.” International Task Force Report,
supra note 16, at 703. Thus, recent studies suggest that, notwithstanding improvements in transfer pricing law
and administration, revenue losses due to transfer pricing may be substantial. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, U.S.
Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United States, 118 TAX NOTES 1078 (2008); Michael M. Phillips, Taking
Shelter—As Congress Ponders New Tax Breaks, Firms Already Find Plenty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999, at Al;
Mitchell J. Tropin, U.S. Lost Estimated $35.6 Billion in 1998 Due to Abnormal Transfer Pricing, Study Says, BNA
DAILY TAX REP., June 1, 1999, at G-2 (discussing study prepared by Professors Simon J. Pak and John S.
Zdanowicz); see also IRS, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 482, at ch. 1 (1999)
(estimating that annual gross tax shortfall due to improper transfer pricing is $2.8 billion, although the IRS noted
a number of upward and downward biases in the estimate); cf. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: FOREIGN- AND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS THAT DID NOT PAY U.S. INCOME TAXES,
1989-95 (1999) (indicating that the majority of large international corporations, foreign- and U.S-controlled, paid
no U.S. income tax from 1989 to 1995). Finally, even where transfer prices are set in total harmony with prices
in comparable uncontrolled transactions, the deferral privilege is still objectionable because it distorts the
business location decisions.
88 See Lee A. Sheppard, Treasury Officials Discuss Reform, Contract Manufacturing, 118 TAX NOTES
1083, 1084 (2008) (“Transfer pricing is dead . . . . Despite everyone’s efforts, we’re not collecting tax.”
(quoting Edward D. Kleinbard, chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress));
OECD, Tax Effects, supra note 6, at 112 (“For many transactions[,]” the enforcement of transfer pricing rules
“is very difficult and may be impossible.”).
85
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E. Competitiveness I
Deferral is a poorly constructed tax expenditure that distorts taxpayer
decisions by providing an incentive for U.S persons to carry on business in
low-tax foreign countries through a CFC, instead of in the United States, and
then to reinvest the resulting profits in the CFC’s foreign business instead of
repatriating the profits to the United States.89 In addition, deferral violates the
ability-to-pay fairness norm that is the major equity standard of U.S. tax
policy.90 Nevertheless, it is warmly defended by advocates who rely
principally on a competitiveness argument that can be stated as follows: the
only non-deferred income tax paid by indigenous businesses in a low-tax
foreign country is the local income tax on in-country profits. The same is true
of foreign corporations operating in the low-tax country but resident in a
country that exempts foreign-source income from residence-country tax or that
allows deferral of residence-country tax on foreign-source income. Without
deferral, U.S. companies would be unduly disadvantaged when competing in
low-tax foreign countries because in addition to the low foreign tax, they
would pay a current U.S. residual tax on their foreign profits while their local
and exemption country competitors would pay only the low foreign tax.
Therefore, so the argument goes, the United States should defer U.S. tax on the
foreign-source income of U.S. companies.91
This is not a request for the United States to give double taxation relief that
would otherwise be unavailable. Amelioration of double taxation is provided
by means of the U.S. foreign tax credit. Instead, the competitiveness argument
is a request for tax system assistance that is not available to earners of U.S.source income.92 This appeal for preferential treatment of foreign-source
income should be closely scrutinized. In our judgment, such scrutiny reveals
89

See Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis, supra note 20, at 528, 530–31, 537–
40; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious, supra note 17, at 468–69.
90 See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness in International Taxation, supra note 2; International
Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 678–80.
91 See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 49–55 (1992); Dilworth, supra note 13; Hubbard, supra note 6; William P. McClure & Herman B.
Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign Income from 1909 to 1989: How A Tilted Playing Field Developed, 43 TAX
NOTES 1379 (1989); Merrill & Dunahoo, supra note 22, at 226; John M. Samuels, American Tax Isolationism,
123 TAX NOTES 1593, 1596–97 (2009); Mark A. Weinberger, Six Observations on Obama’s International
Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES 1599, 1600–01 (2009); OECD, Tax Effects, supra note 6, at 108–11; NFTC,
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 59, at 12.
92 Thus, the competitiveness argument in favor of deferral is an admission that deferral is a tax
expenditure. For application of tax expenditure analysis to deferral, see Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax
Expenditure Analysis, supra note 20, at 528–41.
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that there is no persuasive case for deferring U.S. income tax on foreign-source
income.
This is so principally because there is no convincing empirical evidence
that a general competitiveness problem exists or that deferral is the appropriate
cure in any event. Claims that U.S. businesses suffer from a competitiveness
handicap are rendered questionable at best by their extensive overseas
success.93 Where is the proof (as contrasted with anecdotes94 and special
pleading) of a systemic competitiveness problem95 that is substantially caused

93

For a sample of sources regarding the successes of U.S. multinational corporations in foreign markets,
see Matt Andrejczak & Donna Kardos, Heinz Earnings Rise by 7.2%, Helped by Higher Prices, WALL ST. J.,
May 30, 2008, at B4; Valerie Bauerlein, Coke Net Buoyed by China, India – Profit Is Better Than Expected
Despite Stronger Dollar, Tepid Sales in U.S., Europe, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2009, at B3; William M. Bulkeley,
High-Margin Services Lift IBM, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008, at B2; Russell Gold, Exxon to Boost Spending,
Broaden Exploration, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2008, at B1; Christopher Hinton, Monsanto Net Nearly Triples,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2008, at C14; Kathryn Kranhold, GE’s Strength Abroad Helps It Weather Weakness in
U.S., WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at A3; Tom Lauricella, Earnings Show Split Emerging in Economy, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 18, 2008, at A1 (even in the midst of the recession of 2008, U.S. businesses continued to perform
well in foreign markets); Betsy McKay, Pepsi to Boost China Outlay by $1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2008,
at B3; Betsy McKay, Coke Net Rises 19%, Aided by Weak Dollar, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008, at B3; Betsy
McKay & Anjali Cordeiro, Coke Overcomes Weak U.S. Results; Beverage Giant Posts Better-Than-Expected
Profit as International Sales Continue to Drive Growth, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at B3; Shira Ovide, P&G
Profit Rises 33%; Costs Hit Outlook, WALL ST. J, Aug. 6, 2008, at B3.
94 One anecdote that has been repeated in the literature is the decline of the U.S.-owned foreign-flag
shipping fleet following the 1986 repeal of deferral with respect to that industry. See NFTC, INTERNATIONAL
TAX POLICY, supra note 59, at 106–07; Ken Kies, Letter to the Editor, Mythbusters II: Kies Provides His
Thoughts on Avi-Yonah’s Article, 123 TAX NOTES 1487 (2009); Ken Kies, A Perfect Experiment: ‘Deferral’
and the U.S. Shipping Industry, 116 TAX NOTES 997 (2007). Causation has not been convincingly
demonstrated in this case, however, because the U.S.-owned foreign-flag shipping fleet had been in decline for
several years before 1986. See NFTC, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY, supra note 59, at 107. Even if causation
exists, the case for extending conclusions drawn from this narrow industry to software, beverages, aircraft,
pharmaceuticals, agricultural commodities, and other industries has not been established.
95 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T., DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 22, at 56–57 (“[T]he United States, as a general
matter, is agreed upon by almost any measure to be one of the most competitive countries in the world.”),
Martin A. Sullivan, Tax Incentives and Economists, 111 TAX NOTES 20, 23–25 (2006); Timothy Aeppel,
Overseas Profits Provide Shelter for U.S. Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2007, at A1 (U.S. companies continue
to experience growth in foreign-source profits); U.S. Again Holds No. 1 Rank in Competitiveness Survey,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2008, at A8 (2008 World Economic Forum Report ranks U.S. economy as most
competitive in the world); Marc Champion, U.S. Ranked Most Competitive; Oil-Rich Nations Show Promise,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at A4 (2007 World Economic Forum report characterized the U.S. economy as the
most competitive in the world); AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CARLOS, WORLD ECON. FORUM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, xv,
available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcr/GCR_05_06_Executive_Summary.pdf (finding that the United
States had the world’s second most competitive economy in 2005 because of “continuing technological
supremacy, and a pipeline of innovation second to none in the world”); see also Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership
Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53, 64–65
(2006); Richard C. Pugh, The Deferral Principle and U.S. Investment in Developing Countries, in UNITED
STATES TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 267, 280 (Robert Hellawell ed., 1980) (stating that “one
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by the U.S. international income tax regime96 instead of by labor cost
differentials, product quality differences, regulatory differences, and other nontax factors? Stated differently, if there are specific industries that face an
international competitiveness problem, why is taxation the cause, how does
deferral solve the problem, and why do the facts with respect to certain
industries extend to other unrelated sectors of the U.S. economy? Answers to
these questions have not been forthcoming.97
Of course, a deferral advocate might shift ground by conceding that U.S.
businesses are competing effectively abroad but then argue that this success is
due to the generous tax assistance provided by the current U.S. income tax
regime,98 that withdrawal of this aid would cause U.S. businesses to flounder
in foreign markets, and that copious tax assistance should be continued. This
argument, however, fails for the same reason as the basic competitiveness
argument. Just as there is a paucity of evidence supporting the allegation that

faces a relative scarcity of detailed empirical analysis” in assessing the claims of advocates and opponents of
deferral). But cf. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 189 (opining that the current
U.S. international tax system “arguably” impairs the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals “in some cases”
but giving no details); U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 63, at 43 (“[T]he United States
likely experiences some reduction of both foreign direct investment and its corporate tax base due to its aboveaverage CIT [corporate income tax] rate.” If this problem exists, however, it could be solved by a general rate
reduction.). For a skeptical economic efficiency critique of the competitiveness arguments for the deferral
subsidy, see Jane G. Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of American Jobs Act of 1996, 72 TAX NOTES 1165,
1168 (1996).
96 See Peter Mullins, Moving to Territoriality? Implications for the U.S. and the Rest of the World, 43
TAX NOTES INT’L 839, 844 (2006) (“[T]here is little evidence to assess the impact of U.S. taxes on the
competitiveness of multinational corporations in foreign markets, and especially the extent to which
competitiveness is affected by the use of the worldwide system.”).
97 See Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Taxing Multinationals in a World with Portfolio Flows and R&D: Is
Capital Export Neutrality Obsolete?, 2 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 439, 446 (1995) (“The implication is that
cutting tax on foreign income would not be a very effective way of encouraging U.S. R&D because it has little
impact on foreign sales.”); id. at 453 (“Reducing U.S. taxes on foreign income does not seem to be any more
effective in strengthening U.S. companies’ worldwide competitiveness than reducing taxes on domestic
corporate income.”); see also Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1393 (“Competitiveness has come to mean not
paying taxes to any government, especially a multinational’s home government . . . .”).
In the text above, we are effectively arguing that deferral advocates have a heavy burden of proof.
This is because deferral is a tax expenditure that discriminates in favor of foreign investment by effectively
transferring billions of dollars annually as subsidies to the foreign operations of U.S. multinational
corporations. See Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis, supra note 20, at 532–34. As
noted by one prominent tax economist: “The burden of proof, in effect, always remains with the advocates for
discrimination.” Gene Steuerle, A Consensus Base for Tax Reform, 113 TAX NOTES 371, 371 (2006).
Moreover, “[i]n most situations, a good rule of thumb is that the tax system should be neutral with respect to
the location of investment.” JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 137 (4th ed. 2008).
98 See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
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U.S. businesses are at a competitive disadvantage, there is an absence of
evidence that their competitive success is dependent on tax benefits.99
Finally, we question the validity of defining competitiveness in terms of the
after-tax profitability of a country’s multinational corporations instead of an
improved living standard for its citizens.100 When competitiveness is viewed
in that latter way, the linkage, for example, between public investment in
education and improved U.S. competitiveness101 is far more immediate and
powerful than is a tax subsidy tailored to enhance the investment returns of
U.S. multinational corporations.102 Basically, it is difficult to see how deferral,

99 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, DEFERRAL STUDY, supra note 22, at 57 (“[T]he available data simply do not
provide a reliable basis for evaluating whether . . . [the current U.S. international tax regime] has affected
multinational competitiveness to any significant extent.”); see also authorities cited supra notes 94 and 95.
100 The empirical evidence has failed to establish that expansion by U.S. multinationals into low-tax
foreign countries results in net employment gains within the United States or net trade gains for the United
States. See Martin A. Sullivan, Offshore Jobs and Taxes: Will Democrats Attack?, 119 TAX NOTES 24 (2008);
Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Moving Jobs to Low-Tax, Low-Wage Countries, 119 TAX NOTES 119
(2008); Martin A. Sullivan, A Challenge to Conventional International Tax Wisdom, 113 TAX NOTES 951,
956–58 (2006); see also ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 2, available at http://www.abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2009/090609policyintltax.pdf
(“The primary focus of U.S. income tax policy generally should be to raise revenue in a manner that improves
the lives and living standards of U.S. citizens and residents.” (footnote omitted)); Samuels, supra note 91, at
1593 (“[T]he goal of any reform of our international tax system should be . . . to advance national and not
global welfare—to improve the quality of life for all Americans to the maximum extent possible.”); Lawrence
H. Summers, TCPI’s Ninth Annual Tax Policy & Practice Symposium Keynote Address by Lawrence H.
Summers, 86 TAXES 35, 40 (June 2008) (statement by former U.S. Treasury Secretary that “I think the basic
criterion for measuring the success of national economic policy is what is happening to the growth in the
incomes of average families . . . .”); Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 294–
95, 307 (2001).
The economic theories of capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality, which have played a
large role in the debate over the desirability of deferral, are concerned with maximizing global welfare rather
than the welfare of residents of a particular country. See OECD, Tax Effects, supra note 6, at 96–100.
101 See Joann M. Weiner, Conversations: Harvey S. Rosen, 117 TAX NOTES 857, 859 (2007) (“Empirical
studies . . . show that the growth in income inequality is largely due to differences in educational
attainment. . . . [T]hose who are less educated fall further behind . . . . [W]e need to focus on providing more
education to these segments of the population.”); Sara Murray, Study Finds Sharp Math, Science Skills Help
Expand Economy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2008, at A2 (reporting on a study concluding that if U.S. students had
achieved the improvements in math and science called for by the National Governors Association nearly
twenty years ago, U.S. GDP would be two percentage points higher today and 4.5 points higher by 2015); see
also Conor Dougherty, High-Degree Professionals Show Power; Survey Highlights Worry of Winners, Losers
in Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2008, at A3 (“In 2007, the median income [in the U.S.] for people with a
bachelor’s degree was about two-thirds more than those with only a high-school diploma.”).
102 See J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Point: The United States Should Tax
U.S. Corporations on Their Worldwide Income, ABA SEC. OF TAX’N NEWSL., Fall 2001, at 14, 15; authorities
cited supra note 101.
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which encourages U.S. multinational corporations to shift investment to lowertax countries, is improving the living standards of U.S. citizens and residents.
II. ENHANCING THE DEFERRAL PRIVILEGE: PART ONE—EXPLOITING
DEFECTIVE COST ALLOCATION RULES
The U.S. federal income tax is a tax on worldwide net income. In that
context, the treatment of costs in the determination of foreign-source net
income poses at least two issues. The first is the proper allocation of expenses
to foreign-source income when implementing the foreign tax credit method for
mitigating international double taxation. The second is whether or when an
expense allocable to a foreign corporation’s foreign-source income should be
deductible by a U.S. shareholder where the income falls within the scope of the
deferral privilege discussed above.103
A. The Allocation of Expenses to Foreign-Source Income for Purposes of the
Foreign Tax Credit Limitation
Under current law, the most significant reason that expenses of a U.S.
person are allocated between U.S.-source and foreign-source income is to
determine the foreign tax credit limitation.104 The amount of foreign tax
credits available to a U.S. taxpayer with respect to the U.S. tax on foreignsource income is calculated on the basis of the net foreign-source taxable
income in each of two separate foreign tax credit limitation categories.105 The
foreign tax credit limitation is determined by the following formula: the
tentative U.S. tax (before allowance of the foreign tax credit) is multiplied by
An additional way to view competitiveness is to compare full current taxation of U.S. corporations that
sell only in the U.S. market with deferral treatment for the foreign-source income of U.S. multinational
corporations. Both groups of corporations compete for capital; yet deferral of U.S. tax on foreign-source
income gives U.S. multinationals a competitive advantage over U.S. corporations that sell exclusively within
the United States. There is no apparent justification for this disparity. See generally OECD, Tax Effects,
supra note 6, at 96.
103 There is a third question, which is the transfer pricing issue of when do expenses sufficiently benefit a
foreign subsidiary such that they should be charged to the foreign subsidiary. Transfer pricing will be
discussed infra Section III of this Article. A fourth question is the extent to which foreign persons should be
allowed to allocate expenses to their U.S.-source business income, but that issue is outside the scope of this
Article.
104 See I.R.C. §§ 904, 861(b), 862(b), 864(e)–(f) (2009); GRAVELLE & MARPLES, supra note 6, at 2–3;
International Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 765.
105 I.R.C. § 904(d). These categories are often referred to as foreign tax credit “baskets.” Under current
law, there are two categories or baskets in Section 904(d): the passive category income basket and the general
category income basket.
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the quotient of foreign-source taxable income divided by worldwide taxable
income.106 To determine the amount of foreign-source taxable income in each
limitation category, a taxpayer must allocate and apportion its expenses
between U.S.-source and foreign-source income and then further allocate and
apportion the expense allocated to foreign-source income between the two
separate foreign tax credit limitation categories. Expenses that are allocated
and apportioned to a separate limitation category reduce the amount of net
foreign-source taxable income in that category and, therefore, the potentially
creditable foreign taxes in that category.107 The purpose of these computations
is to cap the foreign tax credit limitation for each of the two separate limitation
categories at an amount equal to the U.S. federal income tax imposed on the
foreign-source income in the respective category.
Because of the limitation’s purpose and structure (which involves
multiplying a tentative U.S. tax determined under U.S. tax law principles by a
fraction, the denominator of which is worldwide taxable income under U.S. tax
law principles), it would be incoherent to determine the numerator of the
limitation fraction (net foreign-source taxable income in the limitation
category), by reference solely to expenses that are deductible under the law of
the foreign country imposing the tax. Indeed, it is fundamental that expenses
that might not be deductible for foreign tax purposes (such as interest on U.S.
debt and U.S. research and development (R&D) expense) should, nevertheless,
be allocated to foreign-source income if they support the earning of that
income. Otherwise, the numerator of the limitation fraction would be inflated
and foreign taxes would be effectively allowable as a credit against U.S. tax on
what properly should be considered U.S.-source net income. The most
important expenses incurred by a U.S. shareholder that routinely are not
allowable as a deduction by a foreign subsidiary under the law of the
subsidiary’s country of residence are interest, R&D expense, and general and
administrative expense.
With regard to interest expense, it was once the case that an affiliated group
of corporations could maximize the foreign tax credit limitation by causing the
group’s borrowing to be done by U.S. affiliates that earned only U.S.-source
106

I.R.C. § 904(a). This basic limitation in Section 904(a) is often referred to as the overall limitation.
For foreign tax credit limitation purposes, taxpayers generally prefer that an expense be allocated to
U.S.-source income unless an expense allocable to foreign-source income either (1) does not limit the foreign
tax credit (because there is sufficient foreign income in the limitation category irrespective of the allocation of
the expense to that category), or (2) may be charged to a foreign subsidiary with an effective rate of tax at or
above the effective tax rate for U.S.-source income and is allowed as a deduction in the other country.
107
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income. The related interest expense was then allocated entirely to U.S.source income even though the borrowed funds might have been used, directly
or indirectly, to finance the group’s foreign affiliates.108 This tactic inflated the
foreign-source income component of the group’s worldwide taxable income,
thereby expanding the foreign tax credit limitation.109 The Tax Reform Act of
1986110 ended this form of manipulation by adopting the currently applicable
interest expense allocation rules. These rules rest on the premise “that money
is fungible and that interest expense is properly attributable to all business
activities and property of a taxpayer, regardless of any specific purpose for
incurring an obligation on which interest is paid.”111 This idea is implemented
by treating all members of an affiliated group as if they were unincorporated
units of a single corporation112 and allocating the group’s aggregate interest
expense in proportion to its foreign and domestic assets.113 Foreign affiliates,
however, are regarded as non-members of the group for this purpose114 in spite
of the fact that their outstanding stock is included in the group’s foreign
property.115 The upshot of this treatment of foreign affiliates is that regardless
of how borrowed funds are actually used within an affiliated group, interest
paid by U.S. affiliates can be partially allocated to foreign affiliates, but none
of the interest paid by foreign affiliates can be allocated to U.S. affiliates.116
This inconsistency has no effect on the calculation of the group’s worldwide
aggregate net income, but it can result in over-apportionment of interest
expense to foreign-source income which, in turn, can cause an unwarranted
reduction in the foreign tax credit.117
Congress substantially cured this problem for years after 2010 by enacting
a worldwide group interest allocation rule that allows a U.S. corporate taxpayer
108 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 944–45 (1987); 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 22.17.
109 See authorities cited supra note 108.
110 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
111 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION
ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 289 (2005); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(a) (as amended in
2006).
112 See I.R.C. § 864(e)(1) (2009). For exceptions, see Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-11T(b)(2), (d)(4) (as
amended in 2001).
113 See I.R.C. § 864(e)(2). For exceptions to the rule of allocation in proportion to assets, see Temp.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-10T(b)(1), (c), (e) (1988).
114 See I.R.C. §§ 864(e)(5)(A), 1504 (b)(3).
115 See Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.861-12T(c)(1) (as amended in 2006); 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at
¶¶ 22.17.1–22.17.2.
116 See 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 22.17.1; MCDANIEL, AULT & REPETTI, supra note 19, at 48.
117 See 1 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 22.17.2.
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a one-time election to take into account the interest expense and assets of 80
percent-owned foreign affiliates in determining the proportion of the interest
expense of U.S. affiliated group members that should be allocated to foreignsource income.118 If an election is made, the interest expense of the domestic
members of a worldwide affiliated group is allocated and apportioned to
foreign-source income, but only to the extent that (i) the total interest expense
of the worldwide affiliated group, multiplied by the ratio which the foreign
assets of the worldwide affiliated group’s domestic and foreign members bear
to the total assets of the worldwide affiliated group, exceeds (ii) the interest
expense of the foreign members of the worldwide affiliated group that they
would have allocated and apportioned to foreign-source income had they
formed their own separate affiliated group.119 This new approach avoids the
manipulation opportunities that existed under pre-1986 Act law while also
avoiding the over-correction that resulted from the 1986 Act. Nevertheless, a
serious problem remains as explained below in Section II.B.
With respect to R&D expenditures, the regulations require that such
expenditures be allocated and apportioned “to all items of gross income as a
class (including income from sales, royalties, and dividends) related to such
product category (or categories).”120 If a taxpayer conducts R&D with respect
to more than one product category, the taxpayer is permitted to aggregate the
categories for purposes of allocating and apportioning R&D expenditures.121
Where R&D is not clearly identifiable with any one product category, it is
considered to be conducted with respect to all of the taxpayer’s product
categories.122
The current regulations allow the allocation of R&D
expenditures to three-digit classifications of the Standard Industrial
Classification Manual (SIC) product categories of gross income (or, with

118 I.R.C. § 864(f) (as amended by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 401(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1488 (2004), which was originally effective for tax years starting after 2008). The
Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3093, 122 Stat. 2654, 2912 (2008), amended this
provision to delay its effective date until tax years starting after 2010. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 110TH CONGRESS
257–58 (2009).
119 Note that there is a “one way” aspect to this formula, i.e., “excess” interest expense associated with
foreign assets would not be deemed to be associated with U.S. assets, even for purposes of the foreign tax
credit limitation.
120 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(1) (adopted in T.D. 8646, 1996-1 C.B. 144).
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(2)(i) (1995).
122 Id.
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consent of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to another classification).123
For each relevant product category, all or part of the R&D expenditures are
potentially allocated between U.S.-source and foreign-source income under
special rules. First, where research is undertaken solely to meet legal
requirements imposed by a political entity concerning improvement or
marketing of specific products or processes, and the results cannot be
reasonably expected to generate gross income (beyond de minimis amounts)
outside a single geographic source, the deduction is allocable only to the gross
income within that geographic source (the “legal requirement” rule).124
Second, if R&D activities accounting for more than fifty percent of the
amount of the deductions in the product category are performed at a single
geographic source, the current regulations provide that a fixed percentage of
the relevant deduction is allocated to gross income corresponding to that
source.125 Thus, the current regulations include a fifty percent (increased from
thirty percent under prior law) exclusive place-of-performance apportionment
under the sales method (described below) and twenty-five percent exclusive
place-of-performance apportionment under the optional gross income methods
(described below) (in both cases, applied after the application of the “legal
requirement” rule).126
That portion of the R&D deduction that is not apportioned under either the
“legal requirement” rule or the place-of-performance apportionment rule is
apportioned using either the sales method or the gross income methods.127
Under the sales method, an amount equal to the remaining portion of such
deduction is apportioned between U.S.-source and foreign-source income
123 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-17(a)(2)(ii)–(iii) (1995). A two-digit code denotes the “major group” (e.g.,
agricultural services) and a three-digit code denotes the “industry group” (e.g., crop services), with increasing
digit codes denoting increasingly detailed classifications.
124 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(4) (1995).
125 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(1) (1995).
126 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (1995). A rule permitting exclusive apportionment at a higher
percentage based on facts and circumstances such as very limited or long delayed application abroad may
apply to the exclusive apportionment under the sales method and the optional gross income methods. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(2) (1995).
127 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(c)–(d) (1995). The regulations provide that if the amount of sales of a licensed
product is unknown (for example, when a licensed product is imbedded in or bundled with another product), a
reasonable estimate based on the principles of Section 482 should be made. In the case of intangible property,
“if the amount of sales of products utilizing the intangible property is unknown, a reasonable estimate of sales
shall be made annually.” Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(c)(2)(iii) (1995). (Under the prior regulatory regime, the
sales amount taken into account was 10 times the amount received or accrued for the intangible property
during the tax year.) The taxpayer does not have to obtain permission from the IRS to change a method of
apportionment that the taxpayer has used for at least five tax years. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(e) (1995).
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based on sales.128 Under the gross income methods, subject to certain
conditions, the taxpayer may apportion its R&D expenditures ratably based on
the ratio of foreign-source income to total gross income.129 The amount of
R&D expense ratably apportioned to foreign-source income must not be less
than fifty percent of the amount that would have been so apportioned if the
taxpayer had used the sales method.130
Over the years, taxpayers have successfully lobbied for numerous rules,
mostly elective, to reduce the allocation of interest and R&D expense to
foreign-source income. For interest expense, these special rules include use of
tax basis instead of fair market value to value assets and an optional gross
income method.131 For R&D expense, concessions from use of a pure sales
method include (1) use of a gross income allocation method that does not look
through to the gross income of foreign subsidiaries, (2) use of three-digit
instead of two-digit SIC product categories to group gross income, (3) an
increase in the percentage of R&D expenditures that may be exclusively
apportioned to U.S.-source income under the sales method of apportionment
from thirty percent to fifty percent, and (4) a twenty-five percent exclusive
apportionment for the gross income method (as compared with none under
prior regulations).132 These concessions permit U.S. taxpayers to significantly
under allocate interest expense and R&D expense to foreign-source income
and over allocate such expenses to U.S.-source income. This both expands
cross-crediting opportunities133 and, as discussed in the next section of this
Article, enhances the value of deferred income (and, hence, the benefits of the
deferral privilege under U.S. tax law).

128 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(c)(1) (1995). For purposes of such apportionment, special rules exist for taking
into account sales of uncontrolled and controlled parties, including foreign corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.86117(c)(2)–(3) (1995).
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(d)(1) (1995).
130 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(d)(2)–(3) (1995).
131 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T (as amended in 2006).
132 Some of the changes were justified in a study performed by the U.S. Treasury Department, which was
published simultaneously with the 1995 proposed changes to the research and development (R&D) expense
allocation and apportionment regulations. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN INCOME (1995). The Treasury study concluded that “[r]educing
allocations [of domestic R&D expense] to foreign income by about 25 percent compared to the 1977
regulations . . . would reduce the potential that the regulations are unfair to many taxpayers while being within
the range of allocations that cannot be rejected in view of the uncertainty of the evidence.” Id. at 11. In the
Treasury study’s view, this change “would imply an exclusive apportionment percentage of about 50 percent.”
Id.
133 See infra Section IV.
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B. The Incongruous Benefit of Deducting Expenses Allocable to Deferred
Foreign-Source Income
Under an income tax, it is generally accepted that expenses allocable to
exempt income should not be allowed as deductions unless the intended result
is to increase the exemption advantage by reducing the zero effective tax rate
to a negative rate.134 Accordingly, sound income tax theory holds that under
an exemption system for avoiding double taxation, expenses allocable to
exempt foreign-source income should be denied as deductions against taxable
domestic-source income.135 Thus, the proposal developed by the President’s
2005 Advisory Panel on Tax Reform to exempt active foreign-source
income would disallow domestic deductions for costs directly allocated
to exempt foreign-source income and also interest (allocated under a
worldwide apportionment approach) and overhead-type expenses
allocated to exempt foreign-source income (without regard to the
effective rate of foreign tax imposed on the foreign income).136 The

134

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 265 (2009).
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 25; AULT &
ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 375; Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for
Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 771, 781 (2001); Joann Martens Weiner, Practical
Aspects of Implementing Formulary Apportionment in the European Union, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 629, 653–54
(2007); see also BRIAN J. ARNOLD & MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE, INTERNATIONAL TAX PRIMER 48 (2d ed. 2002)
(“A country that allows such expenses to be deductible . . . is providing an exemption not only for foreignsource income but also for a portion of domestic-source income.”).
To achieve a measure of simplification, some exemption system countries tax a portion of otherwise
exempt foreign-source income in lieu of denying the deduction of costs allocable to such income. See STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 45; Samuels, supra note 91.
One commentator has argued that under a properly designed exemption system, a taxpayer should be
allowed a full deduction by the country of residence for expenses incurred domestically, even to the extent that
those expenses contribute to the earning of the exempt foreign-source income. He claims that such a full
deductibility approach fosters productivity in the home country by promoting efficient capital ownership. See
James R. Hines, Jr., Foreign Income and Domestic Deductions, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 461 (2008). For a critique of
this capital ownership neutrality theory, see Fleming & Peroni, Exploring the Contours, supra note 17, at
1572–76. Professor Hines’ capital ownership neutrality argument appears indistinguishable in practical effect
from the competitiveness claims made by proponents of the capital import neutrality model and suffers from
the same defects as that model.
136 PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM, supra note 15, at 102–105, 132–35, 239–43. There
have been a number of proposals to exempt foreign business income, including one by the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation that was more detailed than the proposal by the President’s Advisory Panel. See
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 191. The principal difference between the
approach to expense allocation used by the Joint Committee Staff and the President’s Advisory Panel is that
the President’s Advisory Panel would allocate all R&D expense to taxable income. See also Harry Grubert,
Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 811 (2001) [hereinafter Grubert, Enacting
Dividend Exemption].
135
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reason for disallowing deductions allocable to exempt income is to avoid
a negative effective tax rate on the foreign-source income.137
The failure under current law to defer deductions properly allocated
to foreign-source income until the income is repatriated138 enhances the
deferral benefit by producing a worse-than-exemption negative tax rate
on the deferred foreign-source income during the deferral period. For
example, if the domestic tax rate is 35% and the foreign tax rate is zero,
currently deducting $100 of foreign expense against domestic-source income
produces $35 of tax savings that is effectively a $35 negative tax on the related
foreign-source income and results in $35 of additional deferred income until
repatriation occurs.
EXAMPLE 2
Assume that DC, a U.S. multinational corporation, has a marginal
effective tax rate of 35% on its U.S.-source income and a marginal
effective tax rate of 10% on its income earned in Country A by F
Sub, a wholly owned Country A subsidiary. In support of F Sub’s
Country A operations, DC incurs $100 of interest on U.S. borrowing
and $100 of general and administrative expense at DC’s U.S.
headquarters. Country A does not allow F Sub to deduct a cost
reimbursement paid to DC for these expenses.
If the United States defers F Sub’s income, but allows a current $200
deduction for these expenses, the result is a benefit of $50 (i.e., $200
multiplied by the 25% difference in the U.S. and Country A marginal
tax rates) until the income taxed at a 10% rate by Country A is
repatriated. In other words, allowing the deduction creates a negative
tax on (i.e., subsidizes) the exempt foreign-source income during the
deferral period to the extent of the difference between the U.S. and
foreign tax rates times the deduction amount for the period of the
139
deferral.
Allowing a current deduction for interest and other costs

137 See Harry Grubert & Rosanne Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the
Taxation of Cross-border Income, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS 319,
328 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) [hereinafter Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in
the World Economy]; see also Goulder & Sheppard, supra note 14, at 819 (quoting statement by John Buckley,
Chief Tax Counsel for the House Ways and Means Committee, that “like borrowing to carry exempt assets,
you either disallow [deductions allocable to deferred income] or you have a negative tax”).
138 See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010
REVENUE PROPOSALS 29 (2009).
139 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 36; Michael J.
Graetz, A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses, 62 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 486,
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attributable to deferred foreign-source income cannot be justified on
140
tax policy grounds.

C. Competitiveness II
There seems to be a general recognition that if deductions are allowed
against U.S.-source income for costs that economically support the earning of
deferred foreign-source income, the result can be a negative U.S. rate of tax on
the foreign-source income as illustrated in Example 2 above.141 Thus, the case
for allocating the costs of earning foreign-source income to that income and
barring their deduction against U.S.-source income would seem to be clear and
convincing.142
Nevertheless, some commentators oppose these steps where the cost,
though economically connected to foreign-source income, was incurred within
the United States. This position is based on two arguments that initially appear
to be distinct but that actually collapse into a single proposition.
The first argument is that several major commercial nations allow their
resident corporations to deduct costs that support the earning of foreign-source
income if the costs are incurred within the residence country. Therefore, U.S.
resident corporations should not be barred from deducting such costs against
their U.S.-source income because to do so would make them less competitive

491 (2008) [hereinafter Graetz, Multilateral Solution] (“[A]llowing a deduction in a higher-tax country for
borrowing to invest in a lower-tax country can produce after-tax returns greater than the investment’s pre-tax
returns. This means that investments that would not be undertaken by anyone in a world without any corporate
income taxes may become attractive in a world with varying tax rates and no interest allocation. Such
investments clearly will decrease worldwide welfare and will, almost certainly, decrease welfare in the
countries where the interest deductions are allowed.” (footnote omitted)).
140 See Graetz, Multilateral Solution, supra note 139, at 491 (“Empirical evidence about the benefits that
might justify such a policy does not exist, nor does it seem likely that any evidence will be forthcoming that
would justify such negative taxes as standard policy. A far better policy . . . would be for all countries to allow
interest deductions on borrowing in proportion to the assets in that country regardless of where the borrowing
takes place.”)
141 See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 190; PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM, supra note 15, at 123, 241; Dilworth, supra note 13, at 92; Samuels, supra
note 91, at 1594; Martin A. Sullivan, Obama Chooses a Clumsy Way to Limit Deferral, 123 TAX NOTES 1163,
1164 (2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, Clumsy Way]; Goulder & Sheppard, supra note 14, at 819.
142 Opponents of expense allocation have argued that if the United States adopted expense allocation rules
without a full repeal of deferral, there would be undesirable distortions and disparate effects. See Samuels,
supra note 91, at 1595–97; Sullivan, Clumsy Way, supra note 141, at 1164–65. That is a matter outside the
scope of this Article but if the critics are correct, their argument is an additional reason for repealing deferral.
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in foreign markets.143 This is, of course, nothing more than a reiteration of the
competitiveness argument that is regularly made in behalf of deferral and that
fails for the reasons given above in Section I.E.
Closely related is the argument that if the costs incurred in the United
States are allocated to deferred foreign-source income and made deductible
only against that income, it is highly likely that the relevant foreign countries
will reject the U.S. position and will not allow the allocated expenses to be
deducted for purposes of computing source-country tax on the foreign-source
income. Thus, there will be no current deduction in either the United States or
the foreign country for the affected costs in spite of the fact that the costs have
actually been incurred.144
In other words, U.S. opponents of cost allocation implicitly insist that tax
competition will not force foreign countries to respect the U.S. allocation and
that the inability of U.S. multinationals to currently deduct the allocated costs
in the respective foreign countries will render these multinationals less
competitive in foreign markets.145 We are not convinced that all source
countries are so resistant to tax competition but even if they are, this line of
argument is nothing more than a tailored version of the competitiveness
rationale that was examined and found wanting above in Section I.E.
III. ENHANCING THE DEFERRAL PRIVILEGE: PART TWO—AGGRESSIVE
TRANSFER PRICING
The preceding discussion considered how over-allocation of deductions to
domestic-source income for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation can
facilitate worse-than-exemption outcomes by creating excessive foreign tax
credits and greater cross-crediting possibilities. The preceding discussion also
demonstrated how the failure to suspend deductions allocable to deferred
foreign-source income contributes to worse-than-exemption results by
magnifying the effects of the deferral privilege. This section of the Article
adds the next layer—transfer pricing. To the extent that either deductions are
143 See Samuels, supra note 91, at 1594–95; see also ADVISORY PANEL ON CANADA’S SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION FINAL REPORT: ENHANCING CANADA’S INTERNATIONAL TAX ADVANTAGE 53
(2008),
available
at
http://www.apcsit-gcrcfi.ca/07/cp-dc/pdf/finalReport_eng.pdf
(making
the
competitiveness argument to justify allowing deductions against Canadian domestic income for interest
expenses that support foreign investment).
144 See Sullivan, Clumsy Way, supra note 141, at 1164–65; Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 135, at 782.
145 See authorities cited supra note 143.
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not properly charged to foreign subsidiaries or income is not properly allocated
to U.S. affiliates, the benefits of the deferral privilege are enhanced. This
section reviews the challenges that transfer pricing presents to the
government’s efforts at preventing under-allocation of expenses and overallocation of income to foreign subsidiaries when the deferral privilege
provides an incentive for U.S. taxpayers to take advantage of low foreign tax
rates. Example 3 illustrates the basic nature of the transfer-pricing problem.
EXAMPLE 3
DP is a U.S. corporation with a wholly owned foreign corporate
subsidiary, FS. DP makes widgets in the United States for $5 each
and they are sold by FS in its country of incorporation for $100 each.
FS’s sales costs are $2 per widget. Obviously, each widget produces
$93 of profit. If the United States has much higher taxes than FS’s
home country and inadequate transfer pricing controls, DP might sell
each widget to FS for $5, which means that there will be no taxable
U.S. profit ($5 - $5 = 0). When FS resells each widget in its country
of incorporation, it will have $93 of taxable profit ($100 - ($5 + $2) =
$93). Essentially, this pricing tactic moves the $93 profit inherent in
each widget to FS’s country of incorporation, where it is taxed at the
low home country rate with the U.S. residual tax on the $93 being
146
deferred until repatriation occurs.
Since DP and FS do not deal at

146 FS’s only activity is selling DP’s widgets for use or consumption in FS’s country of incorporation. On
these facts, none of FS’s income is foreign personal holding company income, foreign base company sales
income, or any other type of Subpart F income. See I.R.C. §§ 954 (c)(1)(B) (last paragraph), 954 (d)(1)(B)
(2009). Thus, no U.S. tax will be incurred until a dividend is paid by FS to DP, FS engages in a Section 956
triggering act, or DP disposes of the FS stock.
Michael Durst has stated that the transfer pricing strategy in Example 3, under which the
manufacturing member of a multinational group sells at cost to a selling member or members of the group, is
“almost universal among multinationals.” Durst, President’s Proposals, supra note 58, at 748. Durst argues
that this “almost universal” pricing approach is, however, driven by non-tax business strategy reasons and “has
nothing to do with taxation.” Id. His argument is rendered doubtful by studies showing that U.S
multinationals have chosen to concentrate disproportionate amounts of their profits in low-tax foreign
countries. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Obama Launches International Reform: The Battle Begins, 123 TAX
NOTES 646, 648–49 (2009) (presenting a study showing that for 2006, five low-tax countries were the source
of 23.1% of all U.S. multinationals’ foreign profits—even though those five countries accounted for only 3.1%
of the worldwide employment of U.S. multinationals, only 6% of their tangible property, and only 15.7% of
their worldwide sales); see also authorities cited infra note 150. But even if Durst’s argument is correct
regarding motivation, the result of the transfer pricing technique under which the manufacturing member of a
multinational group sells at cost, without any profit, to one or more foreign selling members of the group, is to
ignore the manufacturer’s contribution to the group’s overall profitability and, therefore, to create overstated
income for the foreign selling members, which means enlarged losses to the U.S. Treasury from deferral of
U.S. income tax.
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arm’s length and because, in an economic sense, DP owns the $93
profit on each widget regardless of whether the profit is realized by
DP or FS (because DP owns all of FS’s stock), there are no economic
or market constraints on DP’s pricing behavior that prevent DP from
freely moving the entire profit to FS’s low-tax home country, or from
splitting the profit arbitrarily between the two countries.

To restrain the behavior illustrated in Example 3, the United States
employs a transfer pricing regime that attempts to impose the same price on the
DP to FS widget sales that would have applied if DP and FS were unrelated
parties that bargained at arm’s length.147 Given the absence of economic
constraints, however, the pressure on the arm’s-length standard as an
enforcement device is enormous,148 and this pressure is exacerbated as tax rate
differentials between the United States and other countries increase.149 For
various reasons, unfortunately, the administration of U.S. transfer pricing rules
has not measured up to the challenge. Evidence consistently shows that
imprecise transfer pricing standards and weak or non-existent enforcement of
those standards are contributing to significant income shifting from high-tax
jurisdictions to lower-tax jurisdictions.150

147

See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2006).
For critiques of the use of the arm’s-length standard as the basis for formulating rules governing the
allocation of the taxable income of multinational enterprises among different countries, see Reuven S. AviYonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA.
TAX REV. 89 (1995); Avi-Yonah, Proposal for Simplification, supra note 49, at 1339–52; Yariv Brauner,
Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX
REV. 79 (2008) [hereinafter Brauner, Valuation of Intangibles]; Durst, President’s Proposals, supra note 58, at
752 (asserting that the current U.S. arm’s-length transfer pricing rules “doom the system to unenforceability
and unadministrability”); Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 TAX
NOTES 625, 669–70 (1986); Brian Lebowitz, Profit Sharing as a New World Order in International Taxation,
52 TAX NOTES INT’L 585 (2008); Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for
Solution of the International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?, 56
TAX NOTES 339, 344–55 (1992).
149 See S TAFF OF J OINT C OMM . ON T AX ’ N , A LTERNATIVE P OLICIES , supra note 18, at 18 (stating that
“deferral places tremendous pressure on the determination of transfer prices under [S]ection 482, because the
greater the amount of income that can be deferred offshore in a low-tax country, the greater the aggregate
benefit of deferral to the taxpayer”); Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing
Regulations and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 646–47
(2007) (“[The] characteristics [of arm’s length transfer pricing] render futile the attempt of the transfer pricing
rules to determine the reasonable price at which affiliated transactions would have been valued if made with
unrelated parties.”).
150 See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: EFFECTIVE TAX
RATES ARE CORRELATED WITH WHERE INCOME IS REPORTED 4 (2008) (“Differences in tax rates across
countries appear to influence how much income corporations report earning in particular countries, relative to
the amount of other activity in those locations.”); S TAFF OF J OINT C OMM. ON T AX ’ N , ALTERNATIVE
P OLICIES , supra note 18, at 32–34; (discussing the “[e]mpirical evidence indicating that U.S. multinationals
148
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A. The Magnified Challenge of the Arm’s-Length Standard with Respect to
Intangible Property
The problems just mentioned have been magnified by the dramatic increase
in the commercial importance of intangible property rights, such as patents,
know-how, and trademarks, making it more difficult for governments to
employ the separate transaction, arm’s-length transfer pricing method.151 This
is because intangible property rights inherently exclude unlicensed third parties
from using the protected invention, brand mark, or logo, and the conventional
view, although evolving, is that a highly valuable intangible right will not be
shared with third parties through licensing.152 This factor, plus the unique
nature of intangibles, often means that the independent comparable
transactions that are essential to the effective application of the arm’s-length
standard are non-existent, thus giving taxpayers substantial latitude to
determine how the return on a particular intangible will be divided among
related parties.

continue to shift income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions”); U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 56–61 (2007) [hereinafter U.S.
TREAS. DEP’T, TRANSFER PRICING REP.] (discussing evidence that correlates reductions in foreign effective tax
rates of CFCs with income shifting from high nominal tax rate countries to low-tax rate countries); MICHAEL
MCDONALD, U.S. TREAS. DEP’T., INCOME SHIFTING FROM TRANSFER PRICING: FURTHER EVIDENCE FROM TAX
RETURN DATA: OTA TECHNICAL WORKING PAPER NO. 2, at 35 (2008); SHAVIRO, DECODING, supra note 6, at
106 (“U.S. tax authorities often have a tough time challenging reported intercompany transfer prices . . . .”).
This income shifting to low-tax foreign jurisdictions through aggressive transfer pricing “is equivalent to
increasing the pre-tax return to the offshore investment [in the low-tax countries],” thus increasing the benefit
of deferral and “magnifying the distortion of investment choice” occasioned by deferral. S TAFF OF J OINT
C OMM. ON T AX ’ N , ALTERNATIVE P OLICIES , supra note 18, at 18. Thus, as noted by one commentator, the
U.S. transfer pricing regime “creates an incentive to invest abroad and particularly to invest extensively in
intangibles . . . .” Brauner, Valuation of Intangibles, supra note 148, at 83. Tax rate differentials also
encourage low-taxed foreign parent corporations to transfer profits from U.S. subsidiaries to themselves
through aggressive transfer pricing. See generally Michael Overesch, The Effects of Multinationals’ Profit
Shifting Activities on Real Investments, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 5, 20 (2009) (“We can conclude that multinationals
gain significant competitive advantages by means of shifting profits if the parent company is located in a lower
taxing home country.”) This Article, however, focuses on the effects of aggressive transfer pricing when
practiced by U.S. resident corporations, i.e., on outbound transfer pricing.
151 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 34–35; Brauner,
Valuation of Intangibles, supra note 148, at 156. As stated by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah: “[I]nformed
observers agree that the allocation of income from intangibles is the most important problem in transfer
pricing . . . .” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx and the Arm’s-Length Standard, 123 TAX NOTES 1231, 1231
(2009) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Arm’s Length].
152 There is increased anecdotal evidence in recent years of the licensing of high value intangibles. See,
e.g., Health Care Brief-AstraZeneca PLC: Deal With AtheroGenics Gives Rights to Cardiovascular Drug,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2005, at B4 (discussing AstraZeneca licensing rights to atherosclerosis medication in
late-stage trials for a $50 million up-front payment and up to $1 billion if milestones are met).
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Intangible property, while not passive when used in a business, nonetheless
is particularly mobile property. Moreover, international legal protections for
intellectual property have substantially improved in recent decades so that it is
feasible as a commercial and legal matter to transfer legal ownership of
intangibles to corporations organized in a wide range of countries. Tax law
facilitates these transfers through well-developed rules that allow the tax
ownership of intangible property to be divorced from legal ownership. These
economic and legal features of intangible property make it possible to locate
intangible property in low-tax countries within a taxpayer group to earn lowtaxed income without materially sacrificing the legal protections and value of
the intangible property in question.153 Indeed, the advent of business
restructurings to capitalize on tax and other advantages from shifting functions
and locating income in low-tax jurisdictions has attracted the attention of the
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs and triggered new legislation in
Germany.154
The fundamental difficulty with administering transfer pricing rules where
comparable third-party transactions are unavailable or inexact lies in: (1) the
operational flexibility available to a multinational corporate group in planning
and executing a transfer pricing strategy, (2) the necessary flexibility of the
transfer pricing rules to allow taxpayers to structure their affairs155 (as well as
an arguably excessive electivity of methods), and (3) the information
asymmetry and procedural imbalances described below that distort the
resolution of transfer pricing controversies.

153 See Brauner, Valuation of Intangibles, supra note 148, at 121 (“[T]he regulations leave the important
valuation aspects of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes completely exposed to abuse by taxpayers and
their advisors.”).
154 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRANSFER PRICING ASPECTS OF BUSINESS
RESTRUCTURINGS: DISCUSSION DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (2008); see also Karen E.M. Beck, Business
Restructurings in Germany, 51 TAX NOTES INT’L 271 (2008).
155 The Section 482 regulations adopt a taxpayer-generous arm’s-length range rule that treats results
within a defined range as “arm’s length” and not subject to adjustment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e) (as
amended in 2006). This rule “creates an embedded inaccuracy and an advantage to taxpayers.” Brauner,
Valuation of Intangibles, supra note 148, at 159. Thus, the arm’s-length standard under the regulations as
applied in practice “leaves substantial room for tax incentives to affect pricing.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 35. This is only one element of the regulations’ flexibility.
Indeed, as noted by one commentator: “[A]t each decision level the law permits almost frictionless flexibility
to taxpayers. This flexibility . . . results in significant deviations from the desired accurate result that our
transfer pricing rules purport to target.” Brauner, Valuation of Intangibles, supra, at 157.
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Cost sharing for intangible property is one example of where these factors
inappropriately favor taxpayers.156 Treasury regulations have allowed related
parties to share the development costs of intangibles since the 1960s. A
primary argument made for such cost sharing is that it reduces uncertainty in
transfer pricing. Cost sharing is used by taxpayers to increase the future profit
that can be allocated to the cost sharer by reason of its deemed joint ownership
of the intangible. In many cases, the cost sharer is an affiliate located in a
jurisdiction that imposes income tax at a rate substantially lower than that
faced by the developer of the intangible. In such a case, cost sharing
represents a “bet” that loss from the lower value of deductions for the costsharing payments borne by the low-taxed affiliate will be less, on a present
value basis, than the savings from earning future intangible income in the
lower tax jurisdiction.157
In practice, several aspects of cost sharing are problematic and non-arm’s
length:
(1) Cost sharing is elective to the taxpayer—this implicitly permits a
substantial degree of “cherry-picking” of intangibles to be cost shared;
(2) As with all related party transactions, information asymmetry favors the
taxpayer and allows it to price favorably the “buy-in” amounts paid for
pre-existing intangibles and “platform contributions” and to frame the
documentation and supporting “data” in such a way as to reduce its
apparent exposure to audit adjustment and penalties;158 and
(3) Parties to cost sharing agreements may include affiliates whose interest
is purely financial, as distinguished from the interest of a developer or
user of the intangible.

156 Avi-Yonah, Arm’s Length, supra note 151, at 1231 (“[C]ost sharing . . . is the principal way in which
profits from intangibles get shifted from the United States to low-tax jurisdictions.”); id. at 1233 (“Taxpayers
have used cost sharing to transfer the majority of their intangible assets overseas without having to do any real
research and development outside the United States. Those intangibles then generate income that is eligible
for deferral . . . .”).
157 Id. at 1233 (“[T]axpayers whose costs are $1 million to develop a patent worth $1 billion are happy to
risk losing $800,000 [of deductions] to an 80/20 cost-sharing agreement with an Irish affiliate if they could
avoid current U.S. tax on $800 million when the research succeeds.”).
158 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, TRANSFER PRICING REP., supra note 150, at 48–50. Recent temporary
regulations attempt to achieve more complete recognition of and compensation for pre-exiting contributions of
parties to a cost sharing arrangement. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7T (adopted in T.D. 9441, 2009-1 C.B.
460).
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In addition, intercompany services with embedded intangibles present
opportunities for hiding the issues of intangible pricing and valuation of
intangibles from tax administrators.159
B. Information Asymmetry and the Limits on Enforcement of Any Transfer
Pricing Regime
At the heart of the problem facing government transfer-pricing
administrators is the reality that the taxpayer possesses the facts necessary to
evaluate the transfer pricing decision.160 This problem is particularly acute for
income from intangible property and unique services. In this context, the
effects of practical hurdles to government enforcement are magnified and
operate to considerable taxpayer advantage.
Most often, a government trying to evaluate a taxpayer’s transfer pricing
decision faces a steep information asymmetry.161 Taxpayers need not routinely
disclose relevant facts on either their tax returns or consolidated financial
statements.162 Accordingly, it can be difficult for the IRS to consistently
identify potential transfer pricing audit issues.
159 U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, TRANSFER PRICING REP., supra note 150, at 50–51. While the Treasury has
identified these and other issues as allowing scope for income shifting and has documented that income
shifting is occurring, the Treasury’s remedies have been limited to proposing changes to the rules in the
transfer pricing regulations and increasing audit scrutiny of intangibles migration transactions. The IRS has
made transfers of intangibles and cost sharing buy-ins a Tier 1 audit issue. See IRS, LMSB DIVISION, TIER I:
IRC 482 COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS WITH BUY-IN PAYMENTS: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/quickref482.pdf.
160 See Brauner, Valuation of Intangibles, supra note 148, at 158–59 (“The system is designed so that
taxpayers who take transfer pricing seriously have the advantage of setting the rules of the game and the facts
[are] presented in the way they want them to be presented.”).
161 See Benshalom, supra note 149, at 647. The problem of information asymmetry is especially acute in
the case of the allocation and apportionment of expenses. It is extremely difficult for the government to
readily identify how expenses should be allocated to a category of income or activity. The information
asymmetry problem is also acute with respect to IRS efforts to police tax shelters. See David M. Schizer,
Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 337 (2006).
162 There is required reporting of related party amounts under Section 6038, but these reports do not
highlight when the pricing may be inconsistent with the arm’s-length standard. Although many taxpayers with
large intercompany payments prepare Section 6662 transfer pricing documentation in order to reduce their
penalty exposure, this documentation is designed to demonstrate the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s method
without highlighting major exposures. It remains unclear whether and how the relatively new financial
accounting standard known as “FIN 48” (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 48
of FASB Statement No. 109) will affect this calculus. For a sampling of the commentary on FIN 48 and its
anticipated effects on tax compliance, see Robert H. Aland, Edward W. Trott, Marilyn K. Gerdes, Matthew D.
Lerner, C. Chester Abell, Jr. & Robert D. Adams, FIN 48: Impact on Federal Tax Audits and Litigation, 86
TAXES 241 (Mar. 2008); Jennifer Blouin, Cristi Gleason, Lillian Mills & Stephanie Sikes, What Can We Learn
About Uncertain Tax Benefits from FIN 48?, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 521 (2007); Michael J. Donohue & Mark R.
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Moreover, if the government does perform a transfer-pricing audit, it must
ask the right questions in order to elicit information relevant to the transfer
pricing analysis. The government’s agents must learn enough about the
business and its economics to determine when income and profit margins are
out of line. Well-advised and disciplined taxpayers prepare their cases as soon
as the audit starts (in addition to prior planning for these issues) and know
where the sensitive points are. While a taxpayer must answer an information
document request (IDR) truthfully and fully, the taxpayer has no obligation to
direct the government to the right question or data absent an IDR. Even for
large corporate taxpayers subject to continuous audit, there is a material risk of
non-detection of a broad range of inappropriate transfer pricing.163
Even if the position taken by an IRS transfer pricing auditor has sufficient
merit to support an adjustment of the tax liability, it is frequently the case that
the taxpayer can persuade a higher-level IRS reviewer (e.g., an IRS appellate
conferee or trial counsel) that the factual and complex nature of the case
creates sufficient “hazards of litigation” that the government should accept a
taxpayer-favorable settlement, even though the taxpayer has the formal burden
of proving both that the government’s proposed Section 482 allocation is
unreasonable and that the taxpayer’s allocation is reasonable. The pressure on
the government to compromise is exacerbated by the time and expense
required to try a significant transfer pricing case.
Thus, settlements are common in which the government collects less (often
substantially less) than one hundred percent of the tax deficiency that was
initially proposed by the IRS. Moreover, it is difficult for the IRS to apply a
transfer-pricing penalty in the context of a settlement. Even when the IRS
prevails at trial, imposing a penalty is problematic unless the taxpayer’s
conduct was egregious. While there are (relatively rare) transfer-pricing
controversies in which penalties are applied, the penalty structure generally is
not sufficient to create a significant taxpayer disincentive to taking full

Martin, FIN 48 and Transfer Pricing, 48 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 411 (2007); Darren J. Mills & Kaitlyn
M. Bruno, FIN 48: Where Are We Now and Other Issues to Consider, 85 TAXES 53 (Aug. 2007).
163 In addition, when the IRS does propose an adjustment, it is often so excessive that the government
suffers a damaging loss of credibility with the trier of fact (whether an IRS appellate conferee or a judge). The
taxpayer advantages described in the text are present in other tax controversies as well. What distinguishes
transfer-pricing controversies, however, are the factual nature of the issues and the large amounts of potential
tax liabilities often at stake.
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advantage of the difficulties in enforcement described above (and it is unlikely
that such a penalty system could be adopted).164
These features of the transfer pricing system make it rational for a taxpayer
to take transfer pricing positions that are aggressive (i.e., that push the
boundaries of acceptable transfer pricing results),165 yet within the range of
acceptability under the current rules.166 Failing to do so leaves a tax decision
maker open to criticism. How far a taxpayer goes is largely a function of its
appetite for tax risk and whether the taxpayer (in particular, a public
corporation) can persuade its auditors that either it is not necessary to establish
a tax reserve for transfer pricing issues or that a modest reserve is sufficient.
None of the preceding discussion is intended to refer to tax positions that are
not fully justified from a legal and ethical perspective. Indeed, that is the
point—under current law, aggressive transfer pricing positions are often both
legally and ethically permissible.
The conclusion to be derived from the preceding analysis of the procedural
limitations on the government’s ability to enforce transfer-pricing rules,
particularly when applied to intangible property, is that the taxpayer has a
fundamental and systemic advantage over the government in applying the
transfer-pricing regime.167 Thus, while it is indeed important to improve
substantive transfer-pricing rules, it is unrealistic to believe that this alone will
bring about robust transfer-pricing compliance and help ensure that the
effective tax rate on U.S. taxpayers’ foreign-source income under the current
international tax rules is not a negative amount. Instead, it is clear that other,
more fundamental changes to the structure of the U.S. international tax rules
need to be made. The most important fundamental changes would be to repeal
the deferral privilege and impose current U.S. tax on the foreign-source income
of foreign subsidiaries, as well as to tighten the foreign tax credit limitation.
These moves would prevent aggressive transfer pricing from being used to
artificially increase the amount of income from outbound investments that
enjoys the benefit of a low foreign tax rate.

164 See generally Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27
VA. TAX. REV. 241 (2007) (discussing optimal penalty structures).
165 See Brauner, Valuation of Intangibles, supra note 148, at 161 (“[Taxpayers] are allowed, and have all
the reason in the world, to be as close as possible to the boundaries of the range of acceptable results in each
stage of the analysis. They will always choose the extreme that is most beneficial to them.”).
166 See id. at 108 (“[T]he clear incentive created by the system is to push the envelope and reach the price
that is most aggressive, yet still within the very wide margin of reasonability.”).
167 See id. at 157–59.
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C. Formulary Apportionment Is Not a Panacea
An alternative to the current arm’s-length separate transaction method is a
formulary apportionment regime—a method that uses a formula based on
inputs such as property, wages, and sales to determine how a multinational
corporate group’s income is split between the United States and various
foreign countries. Substituting formulary apportionment for the current system
will not, however, be a panacea for the above-described pressures on transfer
pricing. This is principally because income allocated under a formulary
apportionment method by the United States to a second taxing jurisdiction
likely will be exempted from taxation by the United States as is the case under
U.S. state formulary apportionment regimes. Moreover, the present tax rate
differentials between countries resulting from tax competition likely will
continue to exist. Under those conditions, the taxpayer advantages described
above will allow taxpayers to engage in income shifting to the same or a
greater extent than under the arm’s-length separate transaction method by
manipulating the formulary apportionment factors.168
To illustrate this point, consider the following Example 4, which is a
variation of Example 3.
EXAMPLE 4
The DP-FS corporate group consists of DP, a U.S. corporation, and
FS, its wholly owned foreign corporate subsidiary, which is resident
in Tropicana, a low-tax foreign country. Assume that the United
States has replaced its arm’s-length transfer pricing system with a
formulary apportionment approach that utilizes three equally
weighted apportionment factors—sales revenue (assigned in
169
accordance with the location of the buyers), payroll (assigned in
170
accordance with the location of the workers), and assets (assigned

168 It is possible that under formulary apportionment methods, income (particularly from intangibles)
would be allocated away from low-tax countries where little economic activity involving property, payroll, or
sales takes place. That will depend, of course, on the specifics of the rules adopted. Experiences of U.S. states
suggest that these rules remain subject to taxpayer manipulation. Moreover, if income is allocated under
unilateral U.S. rules to higher-tax foreign countries, it could encourage such countries to adopt rules that would
allow them to tax such income.
169 This is the way that sales revenue is usually allocated under the formulary apportionment systems used
by the states of the United States. See Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of
Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 207 (2008).
170 See ARNOLD & MCINTYRE, supra note 135, at 78.
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in accordance with the location of production assets).
Income
allocated to a foreign country under this formula is not taxed by the
172
United States.
DP makes widgets in the United States at a cost of
$50 each and sells 100 percent of them to FS. FS sells these widgets
for $100 each in Tropicana. FS’s sales cost is $2 per widget.
Obviously, every widget manufactured by DP produces $48 of profit
($100 - $50 - $2 = $48).

Because all of the widget sales are made to Tropicana buyers, the sales
factor in the three-factor U.S. formula will effectively allocate one-third of the
$48 profit per widget to Tropicana.173 This means that $16 of profit inherent in
each widget that is sold to FS for resale into the Tropicana market will be
allocated to low-tax Tropicana and will be free of U.S. income tax regardless
of the small economic contribution of FS’s sales activity to the overall
profit.174 The same exemption from U.S. tax will be obtained with respect to
each widget that is sold to FS for resale into other foreign countries.
Moreover, DP will also have a strong incentive to avoid U.S. tax by finding a
truly independent Tropicana reseller through which to route sales back into the
United States. Of course, the United States may attempt to assert taxing
jurisdiction over the profits on sales into the U.S. market by an independent
reseller, but such jurisdiction cannot be effectively exercised under prevailing
U.S. law if the Tropicana reseller’s U.S. activities are limited to delivering
widgets to a U.S. location.175

171 See id. Thus, the portion of the total net income of the DP/FS group that would be allocated to
Tropicana would be determined by the following formula: (Tropicana sales/Total DP-FS sales × DP-FS
income/3) + (Tropicana assets/Total DP-FS assets × DP-FS income/3) + (Tropicana payroll/Total DP-FS
payroll × DP-FS income/3).
172 See KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING & REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, THE BROOKINGS INST., REFORMING
CORPORATE TAXATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: A PROPOSAL TO ADOPT FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 12
(2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/06corporatetaxes_clausing.aspx. Thus, the typical
formulary apportionment system is actually a type of exemption or territorial regime that uses an allocation
formula, instead of source rules, to identify exempt foreign income. For discussions of the deficiencies of
exemption or territorial regimes, see the authorities cited supra note 17.
173 See supra note 171.
174 Measured on a cost-of-inputs basis, the FS sales activity accounts for only 3.8% (2/52) of the $48 per
widget profit.
175 If Tropicana has a typical bilateral income tax treaty with the United States, the United States cannot
tax the reseller’s profits on these facts because the reseller will not have a U.S. permanent establishment. See
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006, art. VII,
available at https://treas.gov/offices/taxpolicy/library/model006.pdf If Tropicana is a non-treaty country, the
result should be the same because the reseller will not be carrying on a trade or business within the United
States. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.864-4(b), ex. 3 (as amended in 2005).
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At the end of the day, it is quite likely that the U.S. formulary
apportionment scheme described in Example 4 will cause the one-third of the
DP/FS widget profit assigned to the sales factor to be allocated entirely to
Tropicana (and not taxed by the United States).176 Moreover, DP will have a
powerful incentive to relocate the widget factory and the related payroll to
Tropicana. If this relocation occurs, the other two-thirds of the profit inherent
in each widget, or most of it, will also be allocated to Tropicana and not taxed
by the United States.177 Finally, these allocations of profit to Tropicana will
occur even if Tropicana imposes a very low income tax. Thus, formulary
apportionment, like territorial taxation, results in residence countries
surrendering taxing jurisdiction to source countries that then attract investment
away from the residence countries by forgoing use of the taxing jurisdiction
that was surrendered to them by the residence countries.178
This example illustrates that because formulary apportionment is subject to
manipulation and has incentives that distort taxpayer decisions, it is not a
particularly attractive cure for the ills of the arm’s-length transfer pricing
system. As we have argued in other works, a much better cure with respect to
outbound transactions is to repeal deferral of U.S. tax on income earned
through U.S.-controlled foreign corporations.179
Finally, no precedent exists for employing formulary apportionment in a
system with worldwide taxation and a foreign tax credit.180 In order for a
formulary apportionment regime to work in the context of a foreign tax credit,
the two taxing jurisdictions would have to coordinate their income allocation
formulas so that the income apportioned by the residence state to the other

176 One recent formulary apportionment proposal would rely exclusively on the sales factor to allocate
income between the United States and Tropicana. See CLAUSING & AVI-YONAH, supra note 172, at 12. If this
single-factor approach were not remediated, one hundred percent of the profit inherent in each widget would
be allocated to Tropicana regardless of the fact that production occurred entirely in the United States.
177 A recent formulary apportionment proposal would prevent this result by relying exclusively on the
sales factor to allocate income between the United States and Tropicana. For a brief evaluation of this
approach, see supra note 176.
178 See authorities cited supra note 17.
179 See Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 6, at 986–94; Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious,
supra note 17, at 508–14; see also Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Consider Ending It, supra note 22, at 837–38.
Two proponents of a properly designed exemption system, Grubert and Altshuler, admit that adoption of a
burden neutral worldwide system (which would include a repeal of the deferral privilege) “promises broader
benefits” than adoption of a dividend exemption system so long as it is accompanied by a cut in the corporate
tax rate to twenty-eight percent and an elimination of expense allocations. See Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate
Taxes in the World Economy, supra note 137, at 352.
180 For a brief discussion of this possibility, see Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 6, at 1002–03.
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(i.e., source) state bears substantial resemblance to the income actually subject
to tax in the other state.181 Otherwise there will be substantial risk of highly
distortive double taxation and double non-taxation in everyday business
transactions that are handled adequately, if not perfectly, under the arm’slength separate transaction method that is the subject of the international
consensus described above. In today’s world, the likelihood of achieving the
necessary coordination seems remote.
It might be possible to develop a new international transfer-pricing
consensus around a common formulary apportionment method that could be
adopted on a global basis and the preceding issues surmounted. Such a
process, however, likely would take a decade or more and success would be
uncertain at best.
D. The Deferral Privilege Is Enhanced by Aggressive Transfer Pricing
The policy implication of the preceding analysis is that, in the face of the
inherent inability of governments to effectively monitor and enforce any
transfer-pricing regime and the unlikelihood that formulary apportionment can
be an effective alternative, it is important that there be legislative reform that
places structural limits on the ability of taxpayers to take advantage of
effective tax rate differentials through aggressive transfer-pricing strategies.
The most obvious reforms are (1) to repeal the deferral privilege and impose a
current U.S. tax on the foreign-source income of foreign subsidiaries, and (2)
to tighten the foreign tax credit limitation to reduce cross-crediting
opportunities for U.S. taxpayers. Such reform measures would dramatically
reduce the effectiveness of aggressive transfer pricing and thereby lessen the
importance of the inherent limits to transfer-pricing enforcement.182 By
contrast, under the current system, aggressive transfer pricing is encouraged
because it enhances the likelihood of worse-than-exemption outcomes by
magnifying the deferral privilege and the opportunities for taxpayers and their
advisers to obtain negative effective tax rates on deferred foreign-source
income.

181

Id. at 1003.
See also Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy, supra note 137, at 337
(“Burden neutral worldwide taxation removes all incentives for income shifting by US companies abroad
except for any possible role of continuing excess credit positions.”); McDaniel, Territorial vs Worldwide,
supra note 6, at 293 (concluding that a properly designed worldwide system could reduce the pressure on the
transfer pricing rules).
182
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IV. OVERLY GENEROUS CROSS-CREDITING: ELIMINATING THE SHRUNKEN
RESIDUAL TAX AND ACHIEVING A NEGATIVE TAX RATE
A. The Basic Effects of Cross-Crediting
As discussed above, the United States grants U.S. citizens, resident aliens,
and domestic corporations a foreign tax credit183 in order to mitigate
international double taxation.184 The foreign tax credit is in the form of a
dollar-for-dollar offset of qualifying foreign taxes (so-called creditable taxes)
against the taxpayer’s pre-credit U.S. tax liability, but it has long been subject
to various types of limitations. Under the overall limitation in Section 904(a),
the taxpayer’s foreign tax credit for the year is limited to the taxpayer’s preforeign tax credit U.S. tax liability on the taxpayer’s foreign-source taxable
income (i.e., foreign-source gross income minus the allowable deductions that
are allocable and apportionable to such income, as discussed earlier in this
Article185). The purpose of the overall limitation is to protect the U.S. tax base
from erosion by preventing the foreign tax credit from offsetting U.S. tax
liability on U.S.-source taxable income.186 Section 904(d) of current law
separates this overall limitation into two categories, or “baskets,” which
prevent the excess foreign tax credits from one basket of foreign-source
taxable income from being offset (cross credited) against the U.S. residual tax
liability on low-taxed foreign-source taxable income in the other basket.187
Note, however, that this basket limitation system allows a taxpayer to freely

183

See I.R.C. §§ 901–903 (2009).
See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 277; ELISABETH A. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX
CREDIT 2–3 (1961).
185 See supra text accompanying notes 106–107.
186 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 3–4, 18; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T,
BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 63, at 45; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 372; OWENS, supra
note 184, at 198. The foreign tax credit limitations in Section 904, including the overall limitation, conflict
with a strict application of efficiency objectives because these limitations may discourage U.S. persons from
investing in high-tax foreign countries. Stated differently, an unlimited foreign tax credit would more
completely implement the economic efficiency model of capital export neutrality. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS.
DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 18; Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income:
An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 12,
27–28 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990). However, concern with preservation of the U.S. tax base
from inappropriate erosion overrides these efficiency objectives, see supra note 6, and, accordingly, Congress
has imposed some form of limitation on the foreign tax credit since 1921. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM
REP., supra note 60.
187 See 2 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 15.21[3]–[4]; 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 36, at
¶ 72.7; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 34, 377–87; 2 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ch. 57; 1
KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 36, at ¶ B4.16.
184
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cross credit the foreign tax credits generated on high-taxed foreign-source
income against the U.S. residual tax on low-taxed foreign-source income
within the same limitation category or basket.188
Because the income tax system is based on transactions and the
fundamental purpose of the foreign tax credit is to mitigate international
double taxation, a theoretically pure foreign tax credit limitation would be
applied on an item-by-item (i.e., transaction-by-transaction) basis.189 An itemby-item foreign tax credit limitation would ensure that a taxpayer’s foreign tax
credit is limited to the actual amount of foreign income tax imposed on the
taxpayer’s foreign-source income and would greatly minimize, if not
completely eliminate, cross-crediting opportunities under the foreign tax credit
regime.190 Any foreign tax credit limitation other than the per-item approach
allows some degree of cross-crediting, which reduces the residual U.S. tax on
low-taxed, foreign-source income falling within the same limitation category
and in effect subsidizes a U.S. taxpayer’s business and investment activities in
low-tax foreign countries.191 Congress has not adopted a per-item approach,
188 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 18; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note
3, at 373–75, 383–85; MYRON S. SCHOLES, MARK A. WOLFSON, MERLE ERICKSON, EDWARD L. MAYDEW &
TERRY SHEVLIN, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 318–22 (3d ed. 2005); Ault &
Bradford, supra note 186, at 18. Proponents of cross-crediting typically argue that the U.S. tax system should
allow liberal cross-crediting because such cross-crediting enhances the competitiveness of U.S. multinational
corporations in the global economy. See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 22; GUSTAFSON,
PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 375–76; 1 NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE NFTC FOREIGN INCOME
TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY—PART TWO: RELIEF OF INTERNATIONAL
DOUBLE
TAXATION
301–09
(2001),
available
at
http://www.nftc.org/default/tax/fip/
NFTC1a%Part%20Volume1_part2Chap1-5.pdf. Typically, however, there is little or no empirical data offered
in support of such an argument. See also supra Section I.E. of this Article.
189 See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 386 (1985) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS],
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/tax-reform/pres85index.shtml (“Double taxation
would be fully relieved if income derived from each separate transaction were treated separately for credit
purposes and the U.S. tax were offset by a credit for the foreign tax paid with respect to that income.”); AM.
LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME
TAXATION—PROPOSALS ON UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF
UNITED STATES PERSONS 318–21 (1987) [hereinafter ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY]; Peroni, Back to the
Future, supra note 6, at 996; see also AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 362; Kingson, Foreign Tax Credit,
supra note 6, at 17. But see McClure & Bouma, supra note 91, at 1403 n.192.
190 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 189, at 386–88; ALI,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 189, at 318–19.
191 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 189, at 386–87 (“Any
departure from a transactional approach to crediting foreign tax will permit some averaging of foreign taxes
and will therefore involve some surrender of the residual tax imposed by the United States on foreign income
that is taxed by foreign countries at rates below the U.S. rate.”); ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note
189, at 318–19.

FLEMING PERONI&SHAY GALLEYSFINAL

134

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

however, because the substantial administrative costs on both taxpayers and
the government would exceed its benefits.192 Instead, Congress has over the
years used an overall limit, a per-country limitation, or an income category or
basket limitation with varying numbers of categories or baskets. Between
1986 and 2004, a nine-basket limitation system was used. Then the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 changed the system into the present two-basket
limitation system, which became effective in 2007.193 Under this system, there
is a passive category income limitation basket and a general category income
limitation basket, which means that unlimited cross-crediting is essentially
allowed, except with respect to foreign-source income and foreign taxes falling
within the passive income basket.194 It should be noted that even the ninebasket system enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986195 allowed a
good deal of cross-crediting because the general or residual income basket of
that system contained a significant majority of the foreign-source income
earned by U.S. persons.196
Cross-crediting operates as a subsidy for foreign investment by allowing a
U.S. person to credit foreign taxes higher than the U.S. rate on some types of
foreign-source income against the U.S. residual tax on other types of low- or
zero-taxed foreign-source income, which is the equivalent of the U.S.
government giving the U.S. person a grant in the amount of the U.S. residual
tax eliminated.197 Moreover, cross-crediting enhances the benefit of the

192 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 189, at 388; ALI,
INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 189, at 319–20; Brauner, Crystallization, supra note 4, at 286.
193 Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 403–04, 118 Stat. 1492-97 (2004).
194 See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (amended by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004); see also STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 8 (stating that “the current [foreign tax credit
limitation] system allows for a significant amount of cross-crediting”). For a critique of the foreign tax credit
limitation changes made by the 2004 legislation, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating
the Foreign Tax Credit Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax—What’s ETI Repeal Got to Do with It?,
104 TAX NOTES 1393, 1406 (2004) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, ETI Repeal].
195 Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1201, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
196 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 20 (stating that “approximately 75
percent of all foreign source income falls within the general limitation category” of former Section
904(d)(1)(I), before its amendment in 2004).
197 As two of the authors of this Article discussed in an earlier publication, cross-crediting remains a
serious problem notwithstanding the nominal worldwide decline in corporate tax rates. See Fleming & Peroni,
ETI Repeal, supra note 194, at 1403–04; see also Simeon Djankov, Tim Ganser, Caralee McLeish, Rita
Ramalho & Andrei Shleifer, The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 13756, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/confer/
2007/pef07/shleifer.pdf (graph entitled “Effective Corporate Tax Rate on Business Density” identifies
approximately twenty countries with effective corporate tax rates higher than that of the United States). For a
contrary view arguing that cross-crediting should probably be ignored by U.S. tax policymakers and that an
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deferral privilege discussed in Section I of this Article by eliminating or
reducing the U.S. residual tax on a CFC’s foreign-source income when the
income is eventually repatriated.198 To the extent that the U.S. residual tax is
eliminated, the U.S. system of worldwide taxation with deferral is converted
into a “self-help” elective exemption system, which is more generous to
taxpayers and economically distortive than a properly designed, non-elective
exemption system for taxing foreign business income.199
These points about the effects of cross-crediting in eliminating, or at least
substantially reducing, the shrunken U.S. residual tax remaining after the
effects of the deferral privilege can be illustrated by returning to Example 1
presented earlier in this Article involving DC, a U.S. resident multinational
corporation. In Column (3) of Table 3 below, the facts are the same as for
Column (2) of Table 1, except that DC is allowed to eliminate U.S. tax on
repatriated Country A income by cross crediting high foreign taxes on
manufacturing income earned in Countries B and C, two developed foreign
countries with income tax systems that have applicable tax rates above the top
U.S. rate. In Column (4) of Table 3, the new factory is located in Country A
and the United States employs an exemption (territorial) tax system for
foreign-source active business income.

overall foreign tax credit limitation should be adopted, see AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 158–62.
198 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM, supra note 12, at 64
(“[B]ecause excess foreign tax credits cannot be carried forward indefinitely, deferral expands the opportunity
for cross-crediting (if effective foreign tax rates vary across years or across jurisdictions) by not deeming high
foreign taxes to be paid until a year when the U.S. taxpayer chooses also to repatriate low-taxed foreign source
income.”); James R. Hines, Jr. & R. Glenn Hubbard, Coming Home to America: Dividend Repatriations by
U.S. Multinationals, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 186, at 161, 178 (“[T]he combination
of the credit system and deferral can diminish substantially the revenue raised by the United States from the
taxation of overseas operations of U.S. multinationals.” (footnote omitted)); see also Charles I. Kingson, The
Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1270 (1981) (“[E]nding deferral without
changing the overall foreign tax credit limitation might have only limited revenue impact.”).
199 See HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME: DIVIDEND
EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 12–13, 27–28, 42 (2001) [hereinafter GRUBERT & MUTTI, TAXING
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME]; Peroni, The Proper Approach, supra note 22, at 1586; Shay, Fleming &
Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 153; see also U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 57 (2007) (describing how the
current U.S. international tax system allows U.S. multinational corporations to engage in “self-help
territoriality”).
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Table 3
Column (3)
Same as Column (2) of
Table 1, But with
Cross-Crediting

Column (4)
Country A
Location, U.S. Exemption
System

Year 1 Net Profit

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

Year 1 U.S. Tax @ 35%

−0−

−0−

Invested in Year 2 @
10%

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

Year 2 Return

+ 200,000

+ 200,000

Year 2 35% U.S. Tax on
Year 2 Return

−0−

−0−

Distribution to DC
Headquarters

$2,200,000

$2,200,000

Dividend Tax @ 35%

− 0 −200

− 0 −201

After-Tax Net to DC

$2,200,000

$2,200,000

Note that because cross-crediting eliminated the dividend tax in Column
(3), Columns (3) and (4) produce identical bottom-line results. Stated
differently, as mentioned earlier in this Article, loosely restrained crosscrediting—as is commonly allowed under the present U.S. system of
worldwide taxation with deferral and an unrestrictive foreign tax credit
limitation—effectively converts the U.S. international tax system into a poorly
designed and elective exemption regime that is more generous, and
economically distortive, than a traditional exemption system.
Finally, note that the difference between DC’s after-tax net income in
Column (1) of Table 1 and in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 is not merely the
$45,500 difference between Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1. Instead, it is a
200

In this example, cross-crediting effectively eliminates the U.S. dividend tax.
Under a hypothetical U.S. exemption system that follows the pattern of the exemption systems of the
major trading partners of the United States, both dividend distributions from a foreign subsidiary’s foreignsource active income and repatriations from a foreign branch’s foreign-source active income likely would be
exempt from U.S. tax. See generally Fleming & Peroni, Exploring the Contours, supra note 17.
201
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much larger amount of $815,500.202 The explanation is quite simple. In order
to make the $700,000 Year 1 U.S. tax in Column (1) of Table 1 comparable to
Year 2 amounts in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, the $700,000 Year 1 tax
must be “grown” for one year at 10% (we are using a 10% interest assumption)
so that it becomes $770,000203 at the end of Year 2. When we add this
$770,000 amount to the $45,500 Year 2 tax in Column (1) of Table 1, the sum
is $815,500, which equals the difference between DC’s after-tax net in Column
(1) of Table 1 and in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. In other words, the
effect of the U.S. taxing regimes in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 is to relieve
DC’s foreign-source income from both the Year 1 tax and the Year 2 tax that
DC would have incurred if it had built the factory in the United States.
Stated differently, the U.S. regimes of deferral with very loosely restrained
cross-crediting (Column (3)) and exemption (Column (4)) provide DC with a
tax incentive (i.e., subsidy) of $815,500 over Years 1 and 2 for building the
new factory in Country A instead of in the United States. This subsidy can be
enjoyed in future years in different amounts depending on DC’s profits and
reinvestment decisions for Year 3 and beyond, as is illustrated in Table 2
presented earlier in this Article.
B. Export Sales Income That Is Effectively Tax-Exempt under the Current
U.S. International Tax System
Under current U.S. tax law, income from the sale of purchased inventory is
treated as arising in (i.e., sourced to) the place of sale.204 In addition, under the
regulations205 and case law,206 the place of sale is treated as the place where the
rights, title, and interest of the seller of the inventory passes to the buyer (often
referred to as the “title passage test”). In cases where the U.S. seller is also the
202

$2,200,000 − $1,384,500 = $815,500.
$700,000 + ($700,000 × 0.10) = $770,000.
204 See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 865(b) (2009).
205 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1957). The regulations, however, provide that the place where the
substance of the sale occurs, instead of the place where title passes, will be treated as the place of sale if the
“sales transaction is arranged in a particular manner for the primary purpose of tax avoidance.” Id.. This “tax
avoidance” exception promises more than it delivers in preventing manipulation of the inventory source rules
because the government has been generally unsuccessful when litigating the application of this exception. See
3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 36, at 73-42, 73-43; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 90; 1
PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
46 (4th ed. 2003). Accordingly, the title passage test essentially determines the place of sale for inventory
property, with few exceptions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 865(e)(2).
206 See, e.g., A.P. Green Exp. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1167 (1990).
203
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manufacturer of the inventory, the income is treated as partially
production/manufacturing income and partially sales income,207 with the
production component sourced to the location of the seller’s production
assets208 and the sales component generally sourced under the title passage
test.209 The current regulations allocate the income between the production
and sales functions by applying an arbitrary formula that treats 50 percent of
the income from an export sale as sales income, which generally will be
characterized as foreign-source income if title to the inventory is passed to the
purchaser outside the United States.210 Stated differently, the current export
sales source rule does not attempt to actually associate the source of export
sales income with the economic activity giving rise to the income.211 Nor does
it attempt to prevent inappropriate cross-crediting by treating income from an
export sale as having a U.S. source if that income is free of foreign tax.
Instead, this rule arbitrarily allows at least 50 percent of the U.S.
manufacturer’s income from the export sale to be treated as foreign-source
income even when it bears no foreign tax and even though most of the
taxpayer’s economic activity giving rise to the income (the production and sale
of the goods that are the subject of the export sale) may take place within the
United States.212
The result is that 50 percent of the U.S. seller/exporter’s income from the
export sale of inventory manufactured in the United States can be treated as
foreign-source income without regard to whether the U.S. seller/exporter has a
sales office or sales employees abroad, without regard to whether the purchaser
of the inventory is a controlled foreign corporation in which the U.S.
exporter/seller owns a significant interest, and without regard to whether any
207

See I.R.C. §§ 863(b), 865(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.863-3(a)–(b) (as amended in 2006).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2006).
209 See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 863(b), 865(b); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.863-3(c)(2) (as amended in 2006),
1.861-7(c) (1957).
210 See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2006). A taxpayer may instead elect to determine the
amount of production income by using the so-called “independent factory or production price” if the taxpayer
can establish that such an independent factory or production price exists. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(2) (as
amended in 2006). A third, rarely used alternative allows a taxpayer to allocate the income from export sales
between the production and sales function based on the taxpayer’s books of account, but only if the taxpayer
has received the IRS district director’s advance permission and if certain other requirements in the regulations
are met. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2006).
211 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 31, 32 (concluding that the export sales source
rule of current law “can reach results that depart significantly from the ‘economic nexus’ principle”); 1
ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶¶ 16.5, 19.15, 19.29.
212 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, TAX REFORM, supra note 60, at 365–67; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985
TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 189, at 399.
208

FLEMING PERONI&SHAY GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

WORSE THAN EXEMPTION

11/9/2009 8:35:26 AM

139

foreign country is likely to impose any tax on the sales income.213 In fact,
income from export sales of inventory by a U.S. seller/exporter usually bears
little or no foreign income tax,214 unless the U.S. seller/exporter has a sales
office, other fixed place of business, or sales employees in the foreign country
of sale.215 This means that if a U.S. seller/exporter manufactures inventory and
sells it to a foreign customer, which may be the seller’s controlled foreign
corporation, and passes title to the goods abroad, the result is zero-foreigntaxed income, half of which is characterized as foreign-source sales income for
foreign tax credit limitation purposes.216 This result occurs even though most
(or all) of the income producing activity occurred in the United States.
The export sales source rule, thus, enhances the deferral and cross-crediting
defects in the current U.S. international tax rules by artificially creating
foreign-source income, which is typically subject to little or no foreign
taxes.217 This increases a U.S. exporter’s cross-crediting opportunities by
increasing the numerator of the foreign tax credit limitation fraction, thereby
permitting a U.S. exporter to reduce or eliminate the U.S. residual tax on
export sales income by cross crediting high foreign taxes on other foreign
business income (including dividends received from controlled foreign
corporations operating in high-tax foreign jurisdictions) against the U.S.

213

See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)(1) (as amended in 2006).
Most foreign countries would not tax inventory sales income merely because title to the inventory
property sold passes within the country. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note
189, at 399; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 32; ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra
note 189, at 354. Thus, the title passage test for determining the source of the sales portion of the income from
the export sale effectively allows a U.S. taxpayer to artificially create zero-taxed foreign-source sales income
that expands the taxpayer’s foreign tax credit limitation and increases the opportunities for cross-crediting.
See 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, TAX REFORM, supra note 60, at 365; U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX
PROPOSALS, supra note 189, at 350–51, 399–400; ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra note 189, at 354.
This enhances the opportunities for worse-than-exemption results from a public policy point of view. See
Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 153.
215 See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE SALES SOURCE RULES 1 (1993);
see also 2 U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, TAX REFORM, supra note 60, at 365–67; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T,
PRESIDENT’S 1985 TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 189, at 399.
216 See, e.g., Donald J. Rousslang, The Sales Source Rules for U.S. Exports: How Much Do They Cost?,
62 TAX NOTES 1047 (1994) [hereinafter Rousslang, Sales Source Rules]. For a defense of the title passage
source rule for inventory sales, which argues that the rule is really a risk of loss rule that properly reflects the
economic activity generating the income, see Linda Galler, An Historical and Policy Analysis of the Title
Passage Rule in International Sales of Personal Property, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 521 (1991).
217 See U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 32; ALI, INTERNATIONAL TAX STUDY, supra
note 189 at 32; Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S. Multinationals May Be Less Than
Enthusiastic About the Idea (And Some Ideas They Really Dislike), 59 SMU L. REV. 751, 768–69 (2006).
214
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residual tax on the low- or zero-taxed export sales income.218 Stated
differently, because of cross-crediting, a U.S. exporter may be effectively taxexempt with respect to export sales income that is not subject to any foreign
taxes. 219 In fact, the export sales source rule, when combined with the
substantial cross-crediting opportunities in the general category income
limitation basket, may create a negative effective U.S. tax rate on the foreignsource income from an export sale of inventory property under certain
circumstances.220 To be precise, by allowing a U.S. taxpayer to treat one-half
of such export sales income as foreign-source income even though the income
is not attributable to any active business in a foreign country, this rule
effectively allows U.S. exporters to credit foreign taxes against U.S. income
tax on what should be properly characterized as U.S.-source income, thus
potentially creating a negative effective U.S. tax rate on the taxpayer’s foreignsource income.221 The following example illustrates the effects of the export
sales source rule:
EXAMPLE 5
Assume that DC, a U.S. multinational corporation, has a marginal
effective U.S. income tax rate of 35% and a marginal effective tax
rate of 45% on its active foreign business income earned in Country
C, a high-tax foreign country. During the current year, DC has total
worldwide taxable income of $1,000, $500 of which is U.S.-source
income from transactions occurring entirely within the United States.
DC earns $300 of foreign-source business income in Country C and
pays income tax of $135 to Country C. DC also produces inventory
in the United States and sells the inventory to independent foreign
distributors in low-tax Country A. Title to the inventory passes from
DC to the foreign distributors at the time that the distributors receive
the inventory in Country A. DC has $200 of taxable income on these
inventory sales during the current year. None of that income is taxed
by Country A because DC has no office or fixed place of business in
Country A.
218 See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTERIM REP., supra note 60, at 32; Peroni, Back to the Future, supra
note 6, at 1007; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 63, at 48.
219 See, e.g., International Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 703–05; Kingson, Foreign Tax Credit,
supra note 6, at 20–22; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and Simplification
of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103, 118 (2003). The effect of cross-crediting in
reducing U.S. income tax is illustrated with Example 1 and Table 3 in the text above.
220 See Rousslang, Sales Source Rules, supra note 216; see also U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, DEFERRAL STUDY,
supra note 22, at 46; see also PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON TAX REFORM, supra note 15, at 104.
221 See, e.g., Lokken, supra note 217, at 769.
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Under the current export sales source rule, DC may treat one-half
(i.e., $100) of this inventory sales income as foreign-source income
even though it is not subject to tax in any foreign country and, in
terms of economic connection, should properly be characterized as
entirely U.S.-source income. Thus, DC has total foreign-source
income of $400—$300 earned in Country C and $100 artificially
created by the export sales source rule with respect to transactions
with Country A distributors. This latter $100 of foreign-source
income falls within the general category income limitation basket,
where the high foreign taxes on DC’s active foreign business income
in Country C can be cross credited against the zero-foreign-taxed
$100 of export sales income to the extent permitted by the foreign tax
credit limitation. DC’s foreign tax credit limitation for the general
category income limitation basket is $140 (i.e., $400/$1,000 × $350
= $140), so that all $135 of the foreign taxes paid by DC can be
credited in the current year. In effect, DC’s total “real” foreignsource income for the current year of $300 (excluding the $100 of
export sales income that is improperly treated as foreign-source
income under current law) bears an effective U.S. tax rate of negative
10% because the foreign tax credit of $135 eliminates all $105 of
U.S. tax on that $300 of income that is properly characterized as
foreign-source income and also reduces the U.S. tax on the $100 of
export sales source income that should be treated as U.S.-source
income from $35 to $5—a $30 reduction.

Thus, this export sales source rule, combined with a loosely restrictive
foreign tax credit limitation, creates a tax result that is considerably more
generous to the taxpayer than would be a properly designed exemption
system.222 Under a properly designed exemption system, a U.S. taxpayer’s
income from an export sale that is not connected with an active business in a
foreign country would not qualify for exemption, and the export sales source
rule of current law would lose its relevance.223 Thus, such income would be
subject to the full U.S. income tax and no longer be effectively tax-exempt or
222 See GRUBERT & MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME, supra note 199, at 46–47;
Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption, supra note 136, at 812; Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the
World Economy, supra note 137, at 343 (stating that in a dividend exemption system, “[t]he current ‘salessource’ rules that provide a tax benefit for export income for companies in excess credits would no longer have
any impact”).
223 Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 135, at 776 (concluding that “income from export sales not
attributable to an active foreign business” should not be eligible for exemption under a properly designed
exemption system); GRUBERT & MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME, supra note 199, at 10;
Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption, supra note 136, at 814. But see Lokken, supra note 217, at 769–70
(arguing that the current export sales source rules likely “would operate equally mischievously” under the
exemption proposals by the Joint Committee Staff and President Bush’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform).
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subject to a negative tax rate, as is true under the current U.S. international tax
system.
C. Possible Zero U.S. Taxation of Foreign-Source Royalties under the
Current U.S. International Tax System
Under look-through rules in Section 904(d)(3) of current law, the low- or
zero-taxed foreign-source royalties received by a U.S. corporation from a
subsidiary that is a controlled foreign corporation may be placed in the same
general category foreign tax credit limitation basket that contains high-foreigntaxed dividends paid to the U.S. corporation by another controlled foreign
corporation and other high-foreign-taxed active foreign business income.224
Accordingly, through cross-crediting, the U.S. residual tax on the foreignsource royalties may be substantially reduced or even eliminated, thus making
such royalties effectively tax-exempt in many situations under current law.225
This is the result even though the royalties frequently bear no foreign tax at
any level because the foreign subsidiary is allowed to deduct the royalties paid
to its U.S. parent under the corporate tax laws of the foreign country in which
it is resident and the U.S. parent is simultaneously exempted from a foreign
withholding tax on the royalties under a treaty between the foreign country and
the United States. This result encourages U.S. corporations to exploit
intellectual property in foreign countries through controlled foreign
corporations.226 The following example illustrates these points:

224

See, e.g., Lokken, supra note 217, at 764–67.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 8 (“According to one
study, almost two-thirds of royalties were sheltered by excess foreign tax credits in 2000.”); STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 188; GRUBERT & MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
INCOME, supra note 199, at 35 (“In 1994, this flow of excess credit royalties reduced the U.S. tax liabilities of
U.S. parents by $2.7 billion, of which $2.0 billion was in manufacturing.”); Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note
135, at 774; Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption, supra note 136, at 812; Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate
Taxes in the World Economy, supra note 137, at 327 (estimating that almost two-thirds of royalty payments
received by U.S. multinational corporations in 2000 were shielded by excess credits arising from dividends
and that such royalty payments of $45.1 billion “only yielded additional taxes of $5.8 billion”); see also
Chorvat, supra note 83, at 854 (“These [royalty] payments increase the foreign tax credit limit of the U.S.
MNE [multinational enterprise] and allow any excess foreign tax credits to reduce or eliminate the U.S. tax on
these payments.”).
226 See Chorvat, supra note 83, at 854; Grubert & Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy,
supra note 137, at 327.
225
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EXAMPLE 6
Assume that DC, a U.S. multinational corporation, has a marginal
effective U.S. income tax rate of 35%. During the current year, DC
has total worldwide taxable income of $1,000, $500 of which is U.S.source income from transactions occurring entirely within the United
States. DC owns all of the stock of FS1, a controlled foreign
corporation operating an active manufacturing business in Country
D, a high-tax foreign country. (FS1 has post-1986 foreign income
taxes of $450,000 (all of which are creditable taxes within the
meaning of Sections 901 and 903) and post-1986 undistributed
earnings of $550,000, all of which arise from FS1’s active foreign
manufacturing business.) During the current year, FS1 pays DC a
dividend of $220, which is exempt from Country D withholding tax
but which carries with it deemed foreign taxes of $180 under Section
902 ($220/$550,000 × $450,000 = $180). Thus, DC’s total dividend
income is $400, as grossed up by the Section 902 deemed paid taxes
under Section 78 of the Code. Under the look-through rules in
Section 904(d)(3), this dividend income and the associated foreign
taxes fall within the general category income limitation basket, rather
than the passive category income limitation basket.
DC also owns the stock of FS2, a controlled foreign corporation
operating in Country E, a low-tax foreign country. Country E has
entered into an income tax treaty with the United States under which
royalties paid to a U.S. resident are exempt from the Country E
income tax unless the royalties are attributable to a permanent
establishment maintained by the U.S. resident in Country E. DC
licenses a Country E patent to FS2, which FS2 uses in connection
with its manufacturing business. (All of FS2’s income comes from
an active foreign business in Country E.) FS2 pays DC royalties of
$100 under its license for the Country E patent, which is treated as
foreign-source income under Section 862(a)(4). Country E allows
FS2 to deduct these royalties in computing its taxable income for
purposes of the low-rate Country E business income tax. DC is
exempt from Country E income tax on the royalties by reason of the
Country E income tax treaty with the United States. Under the lookthrough rules in Section 904(d)(3), DC’s royalty income falls within
the general category income limitation basket, rather than the passive
category income limitation basket. FS2 does not pay any dividends
to DC in the current year.
Thus, for the current year, DC has total foreign-source income of
$500—$400 of dividend income from FS1, the Country D subsidiary,
and $100 of royalty income from FS2, the Country E subsidiary—all
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of which falls within the general category income limitation basket.
DC’s foreign tax credit limitation for the general category income
limitation basket is $175 (i.e., $500/$1,000 × $350 = $175), so that
$175 of the $180 of foreign taxes deemed paid by DC can be credited
in the current year (with the remaining $5 of foreign taxes subject to
the carryback and carryforward provisions of Section 904(c)). In
effect, DC is allowed to use $140 of the $175 foreign tax credit to
eliminate the $140 of U.S. tax on the $400 of dividend income from
FS1; then DC is allowed to cross credit excess foreign taxes of $35
on the high-foreign-taxed Country D dividend income against the
zero-foreign-taxed Country E royalty income, thus eliminating the
entire $35 of residual U.S. income tax on such income. This means
that the $100 of royalty income is completely tax-exempt, having
borne no tax in either the United States or Country E, a worse-thanexemption result that is inconsistent with sound international tax
policy.

In most cases, there is no need for double taxation relief for these foreignsource royalties because they bear no foreign tax for the reasons explained
above. Thus, under an exemption system of the type proposed by the Joint
Committee Staff and President Bush’s 2005 Advisory Panel on Tax Reform,
foreign-source royalties paid by a foreign subsidiary to its domestic parent
corporation that are deductible abroad would be fully subject to U.S. income
taxation in the hands of the domestic parent corporation.227 Such royalties
would not qualify for exemption under such a territorial system and the ability
of U.S. taxpayers to shield foreign-source royalties from U.S. taxation through
cross-crediting would be eliminated.228 Consequently, the effectively taxexempt treatment of royalties under the current U.S. international tax system is
considerably more favorable to taxpayers than would be the treatment of such
royalties under a properly designed exemption system.229

227

See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 191; PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL
TAX REFORM, supra note 15, at 134; see also Graetz & Osterhuis, supra note 135, at 774 n.4 (concluding
that an exemption system should not apply to foreign-source royalties received by a U.S. corporate parent
payee that are deductible by the foreign corporate payor and not subject to substantial foreign withholding
taxes). However, these exemption proposals would allow a foreign tax credit for any foreign withholding
taxes imposed on foreign-source royalties not eligible for exemption treatment.
228 GRUBERT & MUTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME, supra note 199, at 36; Graetz &
Oosterhuis, supra note 135, at 776; Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption, supra note 136, at 813; Grubert &
Altshuler, Corporate Taxes in the World Economy, supra note 137, at 343.
229 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 189, 195; Grubert, Enacting Dividend
Exemption, supra note 136, at 815–16.
ON
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D. Other Types of Effectively Tax-Exempt, Foreign-Source Income under
Current Law
The purpose of an exemption system is to provide residence countries with
a method for discharging their obligation to mitigate double taxation of
foreign-source income earned by their residents that is subject to source
taxation in a foreign country but that also comes within a residence country’s
taxing jurisdiction.230 Therefore, logic dictates that a properly designed
exemption system should not apply to any foreign-source income that, like
royalties, is typically subject to little or no foreign taxes.231 Such income
should default into the residence tax base because it is not exposed to any
meaningful threat of double taxation. Examples include space and ocean
income, international communications income, shipping income, and certain
types of transportation income, which are treated in whole or in part as foreignsource income under the current U.S. statutory rules.232 Another example is
income from personal services performed by a U.S. person outside the United
States233 but not attributable to a fixed base in any foreign country and,
therefore, unlikely to be subject to taxation by any foreign country.234 Such
income is often effectively exempt from U.S. income tax under the current
U.S. international tax system because of the cross-crediting opportunities
provided by an only loosely restrictive foreign tax credit limitation in Section
904(d).235 Accordingly, the current U.S. international tax system arguably
provides an inappropriately more generous tax result for taxpayers for such
types of income than would obtain under a properly designed exemption
system.
V. DEDUCTING FOREIGN LOSSES AGAINST U.S.-SOURCE INCOME: CLEARLY A
WORSE-THAN-EXEMPTION RESULT
The general pattern under an exemption system is that only domestic
business losses are deductible. Foreign business losses are treated as occurring
outside the system and are, therefore, not deductible against taxable domestic-

230

See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
See, e.g., Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 135, at 776.
232 See I.R.C. § 863(c)–(e) (2009).
233 Such personal service income would be treated as foreign-source income under the place-ofperformance rule in Sections 861(a)(3) and 862(a)(3) of current law.
234 See, e.g., Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 135, at 776.
235 See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 152–53.
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source income.236 To do otherwise would create the possibility of a negative
tax on foreign operations that would aggravate the exemption system’s
inherent distortive effect on the choice between locating business operations in
the taxpayer’s residence country or in a low-tax foreign country. The
following example illustrates this point:
EXAMPLE 7
XCo, a corporation resident in exemption system Country A, is
debating whether to build a new manufacturing facility in Country A
or in Country B, a tax haven with no business profits tax, no
withholding tax regime, and no branch profits tax. Country A
imposes a tax on domestic corporate profits at an effective rate of 25
percent. When XCo thinks about the upside of its new facility—i.e.,
potential profits—it will recognize that Country A’s exemption
system provides a clear incentive to locate the facility in Country B
in order to shield those profits from the 25-percent Country A tax.
When XCo then considers the downside of the new facility—loss
years in the start-up phase and during business cycle downturns—
XCo will understand that if Country A allows losses from the
Country B facility to be deducted from XCo’s Country A income,
each dollar of Country B loss will save 25 cents of Country A tax on
Country A domestic-source income, even though the Country A
income is not generated by the Country B operation. Thus, these tax
savings would amount to a 25-percent negative Country A tax on the
Country B operation during loss years and would increase the
exemption system’s powerful incentive for XCo to build the new
facility in tax haven Country B.

Consequently, it is no surprise that exemption systems typically prohibit the
deduction of foreign losses.
The U.S. federal income tax system purports to tax foreign-source business
income at the same rates that apply to U.S.-source business income, which
suggests that foreign-source business losses should be deductible against U.S.source business income. As explained above,237 however, the U.S. system
gives preferred treatment to foreign-source business income that causes it to be
236 See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 6, at 376–77. France and the Netherlands have limited exceptions.
See Lee A. Sheppard, Cross-Border Use of Losses of Subsidiaries and Branches, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L 711,
712 (2009). In principle, however, there should be no exceptions. See International Task Force Report, supra
note 16, at 726.
237 See supra Section I.
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taxed at lower effective rates than U.S.-source business income, thus providing
a strong incentive to locate business operations in low-tax foreign countries. If
losses from these low-taxed foreign operations are deductible against nonpreferred U.S.-source business income, the result would be to magnify the U.S.
system’s tax incentive to locate operations in tax havens instead of in the
United States. The following example illustrates this point:
EXAMPLE 8
Assume that DC, a U.S. resident multinational corporation, is
debating whether to build a new manufacturing facility in the United
States or in low-tax Country B, a tax haven with no business profits
tax, no withholding tax regime, and no branch profits tax.
Accelerated depreciation and other tax preferences result in a 25percent effective rate of U.S. federal income tax on DC’s U.S.-source
income. Because of deferral and other aspects of the U.S. system,
however, the effective rate of U.S. federal income tax on the profits
of a Country B factory operated through DC’s Country B controlled
foreign corporation will be only 5 percent (and the Country B
effective tax rate will be zero). Obviously, the U.S. system provides
a strong incentive for DC to locate the new facility in Country B.
Assume further, however, that DC expects the new factory to be a
loss operation for the first five years regardless of where it is located.
If DC locates the factory in Country B, operates the factory as a
branch during the loss period, and is allowed to deduct the branch
losses against U.S.-source income, each dollar of Country B loss will
save 25 cents of U.S. tax on U.S.-source income even though the
Country B branch generates no U.S.-source income. Thus, these tax
savings will effectively be a 25-percent negative U.S. tax on the
Country B branch during the initial loss years. This subsidy for loss
operations in Country B will magnify the incentive for DC to locate
238
the new factory in Country B initially as a branch operation that
will later be transferred to a Country B controlled foreign corporation
(to gain the benefit of deferral, aggressive transfer pricing, and other
defects in the current U.S. international tax system) when it becomes
profitable.

A comparison of Examples 7 and 8 shows that the allowance of a deduction
for foreign branch losses against U.S.-source income will create much the
same policy problem for the United States as the allowance of a deduction for

238

See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ALTERNATIVE POLICIES, supra note 18, at 60.
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foreign losses would create for an exemption system country. Exemption
system countries, of course, avoid this problem by prohibiting foreign loss
deductions.
In recognition of this issue, the U.S. federal income tax system has a rule
providing that a taxpayer’s foreign-source branch losses cannot be deducted
against U.S.-source income except to the extent that they exceed foreignsource income generated by the taxpayer’s profitable foreign branches,239 if
any. An overall foreign-source loss is, however, deductible against U.S.source income, thus producing the incentive-enhancing effect illustrated in
Example 8.240 This exception for overall foreign-source losses is highly
significant. Such losses are quite likely to occur because the passthrough
characteristic of a foreign branch241 and the separate taxpayer and deferral
characteristics of a controlled foreign corporation242 mean that U.S. taxpayers
are encouraged to (1) concentrate loss-generating activities in foreign
branches, where the losses are passed through directly to the U.S. owner
without any absorption by the controlled foreign corporation’s profits, and (2)
once foreign activities become profitable, to transfer them to controlled foreign
corporations in order to defer U.S. tax on the foreign-source income and to
employ aggressive transfer pricing.
The U.S. tax system attempts to block the preceding maneuver by adding a
foreign branch’s prior losses to the U.S. owner’s income when the branch’s
assets are transferred to a controlled foreign corporation under the so-called
“branch loss recapture rules.”243 However, because the resulting tax increase
occurs in a year later than the years in which tax savings were realized from
the deduction of branch losses, a time value of money analysis244 indicates that
the strategy of operating through a foreign branch during the start-up loss
239

See I.R.C. § 904(f)(5) (2009); GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 3, at 616–17.
See 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 36, at 71-27–71-29. Granted, the overall foreign-source loss is
“recaptured” by recharacterizing an appropriate amount of foreign-source income as U.S.-source income in
later years for foreign tax credit limitation purposes, see I.R.C. § 904(f)(1), but, because of the time value of
money, this recharacterization does not eliminate the advantage of deducting an overall foreign loss against
U.S.-source income.
241 As noted in supra note 26, for U.S. income tax purposes, a foreign branch is treated as lacking a legal
personality separate from its corporate owner.
242 See supra Section I.A.
243 See I.R.C. § 367(a)(3)(C); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-6T (1986); 2 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note
32, at ¶ 15.81[1][c]; 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 36, at 71-27–71-29; GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH,
supra note 3, at 769–72; 3 ISENBERGH, supra note 31, at ¶ 92.10; 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 36, at
¶ B2.04[4][g][ix].
244 See, e.g., DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 76, at 23–26.
240
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period and then switching to a controlled foreign corporation operation when
profits begin to flow remains an attractive approach. Thus, this additional
feature of the current U.S. international tax system provides an incentive for
U.S. taxpayers to locate business operations in low-tax foreign countries and
obtain tax results that are inappropriately more generous (and distortive) than
those that may be attained in a properly designed exemption system.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have discussed how various defects in the current U.S.
international tax system—deferral, defective income-sourcing and costallocation rules, generous transfer-pricing rules, generous cross-crediting, the
export sales source rule, the effectively tax-exempt treatment of many types of
foreign-source royalties, and the deduction of foreign losses against U.S.source income—can be combined to make the present U.S. system as generous
as, and in some important respects more generous than, a properly designed
exemption or territorial system for taxing foreign-source income of U.S.
resident corporations. In other words, when judged from a public policy
standpoint, the current U.S. system can produce worse-than-exemption results.
Because of this, the U.S. multinational corporate community largely has
shifted its lobbying efforts away from support for an exemption or territorial
system and toward support for changes in the current incoherent international
tax system that would further reduce the effective U.S. income tax rate on U.S.
corporations’ foreign-source income by magnifying the worse-than-exemption
results. In our view, reform efforts in the international tax area should be
directed toward comparing the strengths and weaknesses of a properly
designed worldwide system with the strengths and weaknesses of a properly
designed exemption system, and then proceeding to enact one of those two
coherent systems for taxing the international income of U.S. persons. Based
on our prior work245 in the international tax area, we believe that such an
analysis will lead to a conclusion that a strengthened and properly designed
worldwide system is superior to a properly designed territorial system and is
definitely superior to our defective and incoherent current U.S. international
tax system.

245

See authorities cited supra note 17.

FLEMING PERONI&SHAY GALLEYSFINAL

150

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

